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INTRODUCTION
In early 2002, I climbed on a plane-along with 
my pregnant wife
and two-year old daughter-for a thirty-hour 
flight from Los Angeles
to India. Our destination was Hyderabad, 
in the south-central part of
the country, where we would be living and 
working for the next two
months. At the other end of the flight we got off, 
tired and anxious,
into a very different part of the world. 
Cows really did cross the
streets. Shabby tent cities littered abandoned 
lots-sometimes right
in front of mansions. Motor scooters loaded 
with husband, wife, and
kids darted between bicycles, three-wheeled 
taxis, pedestrians, and
trucks. There were people everywhere, dressed in bright 
reds, greens,
pinks, and oranges, and they scurried among 
small roadside shops
and cafes that seemed to be open all the time. 
It was eleven-and-a-half
hours later back in L.A. but, if anything, 
all of our senses seemed
sharpened.
I had accepted a teaching position at a prominent 
new business
school, started in conjunction with several Western universities, 
and it
was the perfect place to take the pulse of 
economic trends in India.
Most of the students and faculty were excited 
about technology-
software development, networking, and 
the telecommunications
industry in particular. Y2K fears had put 
Indian software program-
mers to work, and IT budget pressures in 
the wake of the dot-coin
implosion kept them there. A handful of 
students were talking about
outsourcing beyond call centers and software 
maintenance, but for
the most part the focus seemed to be elsewhere-on 
things like
finance, consumer marketing and, above all, 
technology.
Nearly four years later, I took the same flight 
(actually a shorter
one this time since there was a direct 
route into Hyderabad) and
returned for another teaching visit at the business 
school. It is hard to
describe the economic transformation that 
had occurred while I was
away. The people and cows were still everywhere, 
but now they corn-
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peted with Hondas and Hyundais more than with bicycles. Gigantic
new shopping malls dominated the city center; several were multi-
level stores specializing in just wedding apparel. Work crews demol-
ished decrepit roadside shops to widen the streets, and many of the
shanty-towns were replaced with sparkling new office buildings.
Most strikingly, the signs of business outsourcing were every-
where. Loud explosions interrupted the late afternoon, as Microsoft
built a massive campus for thousands of workers. ' People argued over
the effects of English accent training on Indian culture-the buzz of
conversation was now peppered with a Manhattan staccato or south-
ern drawl from some call-center workers. I asked my class of a hun-
dred students whether they had worked on an outsourcing
transaction, and nearly seventy percent raised their hand. Everyone
was looking for the next wave-was it legal services outsourcing, 2
pharmaceutical R&D outsourcing, animation, or something else? You
could almost feel the exuberance in the air. And it wasn't just Hydera-
bad; even the Communist governments in West Bengal and Kerala
were aggressively courting foreign investment.- Business outsourcing
had saturated the Indian economy.
And India is certainly not the only country-although perhaps it
is the most prominent one-affected by business outsourcing. By
2008, an estimated 4.1 million jobs in the service sector will have
moved from developed economies to places like China, India, Russia,
Brazil, and the Philippines. 4 According to the McKinsey Global Insti-
I In fact, the Hyderabad facility will apparently become Microsoft's second-larg-
est campus after its Redmond, Washington headquarters. See Saritha Rai, Microsoft
Expands Operations in India, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2004, at Wi.
2 For a discussion of the possibilities here, see Jayanth K. Krishnan, Outsourcing
and the Globalizing Legal Profession, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming May 2007).
3 For example, on a recent trip to Kolkata I was invited to meet with the Minister
for Information Technology for the State of West Bengal-an area reputed to have
taken a slow approach to outsourcing. I expected to discuss some basic questions
related to attracting foreign business, but was treated, instead, to a very sophisticated
PowerPoint presentation on why the Communist-led state was the ideal place to estab-
lish an offshore project. And, indeed, Kolkata has built some of the best roads in
India, cleared massive areas of land, amended labor laws, and sponsored elaborate
conferences to court foreign investment. Interview with Shri Manabendra
Mukherjee, Minister for Info. Tech. & Env't, Gov't of W. Bengal, India, in Kolkaa,
India (Dec. 8, 2005).
4 DIANA FARRELL ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., THE EMERGING GLOBAL LABOR
MARKET: PART It-THE DEMAND FOR OFFSHORE TALENT IN SERVICES 23-25 (2005),
available at http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/reports/pdfs/emerginggloballabornar-
ket/partl/MGI-demand-fullreport.pdf. As of 2003, India controlled about a third of
the offshore services market; Ireland, Canada, the Phillipines, Israel, and other parts
of Asia were other large offshore service suppliers. Id. at 13 exhibit 1.
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tute, this is just a tiny proportion of the jobs that could theoretically
be outsourced-it estimates that nearly 160 million 
jobs in the service
economy, about eleven percent of total employment, 
could be per-
formed anywhere in the world.
5 No one expects this many positions
to move overseas, but analysts do project the size of the total 
offshor-
ing market to grow rapidly.
6
Firms keep some of this relocated activity under 
their own con-
trol by building "captive" offshore facilities that 
become, in essence,
foreign subsidiaries of the parent firm.
7 But many of these projects
are moving economic production beyond a firm's 
borders-as compa-
nies contract with third party vendors to do something 
that they have
historically done themselves. In short, we are 
witnessing a significant
realignment in the scope of the firm.
This Article addresses an obvious set of questions: 
Why has busi-
ness outsourcing grown so far so fast? What is causing 
so many firms to
move economic activity beyond their corporate 
and country borders?
The question is important for corporate law scholars 
because it
raises foundational issues underlying the theory 
of the firm. Indeed,
the decision to pool resources under centralized 
control presents the
fundamental tension in corporate law literature.
8 The issues date
5 Id. at 22. McKinsey estimated this figure 
by examining business activities in
eight industry sectors and extrapolating these 
results to the entire service economy.
Id. at 22-23. The report does not suggest, however, 
that the actual number of jobs
outsourced will come close to 160 million, citing 
a wide variety of industrial, organiza-
tional, regulatory, and social factors that will limit 
the number of jobs transferred out
of developed economies to roughly 2.5% of this 
160 million figure. Id. at 25-28.
6 See, e.g., FARRELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 29; NASSCOM-McKINSE 
REPORT 2005:
EXTENDING INDIA'S LEADERSHIP IN THE 
GLOBAL IT AND BPO INDUSTRIES 13 (2005),
http://www.mckinsey.com/ideas/articles/Nasscom_3_Executive 
summary.pdf [here-
inafter NASSCOM-MCKINSEY REPORT 2005] (estimating 
that offshore services will
grow to $60 billion by 2010). A large collection of reports 
and statistics related to the
growth of offshore outsourcing can also be found 
at Real Time Tech. Solutions, Statis-
tics Related to Offshore Outsourcing, http://www.rttsweb.com/outsourcing/statistics
(last visited Jan. 16, 2007). But see DELOITrE CONSULTING, 
CALLING A CHANGE IN THE
OUTSOURCING MARKET 25 (2005), available at http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/
content/us.outsourcing-callingachange'pdf (warning that 
outsourcing is not work-
ing for many firms and that growth is likely to wane).
7 For a more precise categorization of business 
outsourcing, and the important
distinction between outsourcing and offshoring, 
see infra note 42.
8 See, e.g., HOWELL E. JACKSON ET AL., ANALYTICAL 
METHODS FOR LAWYERS 227
(2003) ("[T] he tension between the value of retaining managerial 
discretion (to pro-
mote efficiencies in the corporate form, as outlined 
in Coase's the Nature of the Firm)
and the dangers of unchecked managerial discretion 
. . .is the central issue in corpo-
rate law."); Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate 
Law 9-10 (Yale Law Sch.,
Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Pub. Policy, Research Paper 
No. 323, 2005), available at http://
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back at least seventy years-to the celebrated work of Ronald Coase9
and of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means.10 On the one hand, it's nice
to be big. Assembling property under the discretionary control of a
small management team can certainly create economies of scale, save
transaction costs, and lead to other benefits.I But on the other hand,
it is now well established that the separation of ownership and control
can unleash a wide variety of bad manager behavior, such as shirking,
lavish compensation, entrenchment, and excessive risk-taking-collec-
tively referred to as agency costs. 12
This friction between size and sloth permeates the study of corpo-
rate law, especially in discussions of executive compensation and cor-
porate capital structure.15 The extensive literature in these fields
debates the magnitude of agency costs and wrestles with ideas for miti-
gating these problems-using things like executive stock options,1 4
management performance targets,15 leveraged buyouts, 16 debt cove-
ssrn.com/abstract=-824050 (sketching the historical tension between transaction cost
and agency cost theories of the firm).
9 R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMIcA 386 (1937).
10 ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN COmORAT1ON AND PR!-
VATE PROPERTY (1932).
11 Specific benefits of the corporate form and centralized managerial discretion
are discussed infra Part I.B.
12 See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 10, at 112-16; Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3
J. FIN. ECON. 305, 312-13 (1976). The agency cost problem is discussed infra Part
II.A.
13 For recent synthesis of work in these areas, see LuctAN BEBCHtJK & JESSE FRIED,
PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE (2004) (exploring the tension in executive compensa-
tion); JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CoRPoRATE FINANCE 68-73, 154-56 (2006) (col-
lecting work on transactional economics and agency theory related to corporate
capital structure decisions).
14 See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 12, at 308-13, 323-25 (discussing the
use of options and equity compensation as a tool to reduce agency costs); Michael C.
Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL.
ECON. 225, 261-62 (1990) (arguing that executive salary is not linked to perform-
ance); David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive
Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 440, 452-59 (2000) (analyzing hedging transactions
used by managers to undermine the effectiveness of options as a technique for com-
bating agency costs).
15 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the
Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 751, 801 (2002) (discussing how
linking compensation grants to performance targets can avoid "windfall" compensa-
tion and better align manager incentives); Marcel Kahan, The Limited Significance of
Norms for Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. Ryv. 1869, 1879 (2001) (same).
16 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and
Takeovers, 16 Am. ECON. REv. 323, 323-25 (1986) ("[L]everaged buyout (LBO) trans-
actions... are creating a new organizational form that competes successfully with the
(VOL. 82:3
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nants,1 7 and shareholder access initiatives.'
8  But the tension has
hardly been explored in business outsourcing'
9- which is surprising
because outsourcing has received such widespread 
public attention in
recent years. 20 This Article suggests that 
the business outsourcing
phenomenon offers a valuable, but previously 
neglected, context for
analyzing the fundamental tradeoffs that 
occur when ownership is
parted from control. Essentially, it considers 
theories of the firm from
an opposite perspective: why does activity move 
outside the firm,
rather than why activity is placed inside it.
So let me come back to my earlier question: 
why have we seen
such a notable shift in the optimal balance between 
intrafirm activity
and interfirm contracts over the past decade? 
The conventional expla-
nation for the outsourcing explosion runs 
something like this. Rela-
open corporate form because of advantages 
of controlling the agency costs of free
cash flow.").
17 See, e.g., Yakov Amihud et al., A New Governance 
Structure for Corporate Bonds, 51
STAN. L. REv. 447, 453-56 (1999) (discussing the agency 
costs that arise with the use
of debt and various bond covenants); Daniel R. Fischel, 
The Economics of Lender Liabil-
ity, 99 YALE L.J. 131, 133-40 (1989) (discussing agency 
distortions in the lending rela-
tionship); Marcel Kahan & David Yermack, Investment 
Opportunities and the Design of
Debt Securities, 14J.L. ECON. & ORG. 136, 138 (1998) (raising 
problems with the use of
bond covenants as a mechanism for mitigating 
creditor agency risk).
18 Compare Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case 
for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118
HARV. L. REV. 835, 908 (2005) ("[M]aking shareholder 
intervention possible would
operate to reduce agency costs between 
management and its shareholders and 
to
enhance shareholder value."), with Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
The Case for Limiting Share-
holder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 
603-12 (2006) (arguing that increasing
shareholder intervention would undermine 
the value of centralized decisionmaking
in large corporations).
19 Previous legal and economic scholarship 
has recognized the agency costs of
business outsourcing, but most articles 
deal with theoretical models of optimal 
con-
tract design or with technical, practitioner-oriented 
advice. See infra notes 126-27 and
accompanying text. I am unaware of previous 
work offering a detailed analysis of the
contractual methods used in a typical outsourcing 
transaction to mitigate agency risk.
20 See, e.g., THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE 
WORLD Is FLAT (2005) (offering a bestsel-
ling account of the outsourcing phenomenon). 
Business newspapers and magazines
publish a constant stream of stories on 
the growth of outsourcing. For a few 
typical
examples, see Pete Engardio et al., Is 
Your Job Next?, Bus. Wic, Feb. 3, 2003, 
at 50
("Outsourcing experts say the big job migration has 
just begun.... The really big
offshore push won't be until 2010 or so 
• . . when global white-collar sourcing prac-
tices are standardized."); Justin Fox, Where Your Job is 
Going, FORTUNE, Nov. 24, 2003,
at 84 ("Where Your Job is Going: a visit to Bangalore, 
India, a city where tech is hot,
the drinks are cold, work is plentiful, 
and the salaries are a whole lot lower 
than
yours."); The Next Wave: India's IT and Remote-Service 
Industries Just Keep on Growing,
EcONOMisT, Dec. 17, 2005, at 57 [hereinafter 
The Next Wave] ("So strong are the
forces driving this shift that what seemed 
improbably rosy projections . . . back in
1999, are coming true.").
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tively high transaction costs have historically prevented 
firms from
tapping into the global supply of labor. As these costs 
drop, how-
ever-through improvements in communication, digitization, 
stand-
ardization, and the like-it becomes economical for firms 
to embrace
overseas production.21  In essence, falling interaction 
costs have
unlocked a massive supply of labor, driving down 
the price of eco-
nomic inputs, realigning business processes, 
and tempting (or forc-
ing22 ) managers to move production outside 
the firm.23 This
explanation comports with intuition and empirical 
observation, and
certainly there must be some truth to the story.
This Article argues, however, that there is a second 
important cat-
alyst for the rise of business outsourcing-one 
rooted in the agency
cost problem. For while business outsourcing 
can bring interesting
opportunities, it also introduces some familiar 
anxieties. Just as a
21 Much of this analysis occurs in the business 
management and marketing litera-
ture. See, e.g., Erik Brynjolfsson et al., Does Information Technology 
Lead to Smaller Firms?,
40 MGMT. SCI. 1628, 1630-33 (1994); Eric K. Clemons 
et al., The Impact of Information
Technology on the Organization of Economic Activity: 
"The Move to the Middle" Hypothesis, J.
MGMT. INFO. Sys., Fall 1993, at 9, 11-14; 
Vijay Gurbaxani & Seungjin Whang, The
Impact of Information Systems on Organizations and Markets, 
34 CoMms. oF ACM, Jan.
1991, at 59, 63-66; Ramesh Sankaranarayanan 
& Arun Sundararajan, Electronic Mar-
kets, Search Costs and Firm Boundaries 3 (Ctr. for Digital 
Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. CeDER-05-
2 2
, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=78591
4
. The popular
press gives similar accounts of the rise in globalization 
and business outsourcing. See,
e.g., LOWELL BRYAN ET AL., RACE FOR THE WORLD 
14-29 (1999); FRIEDMAN, supra note
20, at 126-36.
22 A central debate over offshoring and 
outsourcing involves macroeconomic cul-
tural, distributional, and social effects. See, 
e.g., The Offshoring of High-Skilled Jobs, Part
II: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Small Business, 
108th Cong. 1 (2003) (opening
statement of Don Manzullo, Chairman, House 
Comm. on Small Business) [hereinaf-
ter House Comm. on Small Business Hearing] (questioning 
whether "the offshoring of
high-paying, high-skilled jobs. . . has serious consequences 
for the long term eco-
nomic viability of this country"); JAGOISH BHAGwATi, IN DEFENSE 
OF GLOBALIZATION
(2004) (advocating open markets); JOSEPH E. STICLITZ, 
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS Dis-
CONTENTS 214-52 (2002) (presenting policy concerns 
related to globalization); Doug-
las A. Irwin, 'Outsourcing'Is Goodfor America, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 28, 2004, at Al6 (arguing
the benefits of free trade and labor flexibility); Charles 
Schumer & Paul Craig Rob-
erts, Op-Ed., Second Thoughts on Free Trade, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2004, at A23 (arguing
that more restrictive trade policies are 
required to deal with the fact that large
workforces can now be easily located anywhere 
in the world). These issues, while
certainly important, are not a focus of 
this Article, and I will concentrate on
microeconomic, firm-level decisions related 
to the organization and location of pro-
duction-not on the collective macroeconomic 
and social impact of these decisions.
23 See Vivek Agrawal et al., Offshoring and Beyond, McKINSEY 
Q.-SPECAL EDITION:
GLOBAL DIRECTIONs, 2003, at 24; Thomas H. Davenport, The 
Coming Commoditization of
Processes, HARv. Bus. REv., June 2005, at 100, 
107-08 (discussing the use of process
standards to facilitate efficient outsourcing); supra note 
21.
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CEO may slack off, build a fancy office, or make risky bets 
with share-
holder dollars, an outsourcing vendor may abuse 
its power to conduct
economic activity that impacts another firm.
2 4 Essentially, a company
outsourcing an activity faces the same dilemma 
where control is
divorced from ownership.
25 The outsourcing vendor controls the
activity, while the outsourcing firm "owns" the 
result. These agency
costs raise a significant impediment to business 
outsourcing and are a
major reason why firms elect to keep economic activity within 
their
borders. 2
6
The thesis of this Article is that business outsourcing 
has thrived
in recent years not only because globalization 
has unlocked inexpen-
sive production markets, but also because it 
is becoming easier for
firms to monitor and prevent the agency costs 
of outsourcing. Over
the past decade, firms have undertaken a variety 
of intriguing tactics
for mitigating agency problems in the business 
outsourcing context.
Drawing upon a detailed analysis of outsourcing 
contracts, I will
explore several strategies to minimize agency costs-including 
the use
of staged contractual commitment, redundant 
agents, incentive-com-
patible compensation, exit rights, and other techniques. 
To be sure,
the issues here can arise in any long-term or relational 
contract.27 But
the recent explosion in business outsourcing offers 
a fresh perspective
on the ways that private parties take strategic and 
contractual steps to
minimize agency risks.
For example, it is certainly more expensive to 
manage several out-
sourcing vendors who perform the exact same 
activity. But these
24 See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 12, 
at 310 ("Contractual relations are
the essence of the firm, not only with employees 
but with suppliers, customers, credi-
tors, etc. The problem of agency costs and 
monitoring exists for all of these
contracts. . . ").
25 Throughout this Article I use the agency vocabulary 
in an economic sense-
and not in a legal sense. The difference is that 
legal creation of an agency relation-
ship requires a showing of control by the principal 
and gives rise to an elevated collec-
tion of agent responsibilities. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1, §§ 376-98
(1958); R.ESTATEMENT (TtuRw) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (Tentative 
Draft No. 2, 2001).
26 See infra Part II.B.
27 The relational contracting literature typically 
explores situations where parties
rely on long term relationships or private ordering-rather 
than the law-to govern
business affairs. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert 
E. Scott, Principles of Relational
Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1092-95 (1981); Morten Hviid, 
Long-Term Contracts and
Relational Contracts, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 
AND ECONOMICS § 4200, at 46-72
(Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest eds., 2000) (reviewing 
the relational con-
tracting literature); Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in 
Long-Term Contracts, 75
CAL. L. REv. 2005, 2009-12 (1987). The lasting nature of 
these contracts will present
agency risk if one party controls economic activity 
that affects the other party's wealth.
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 12, at 308-13.
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increased costs might reduce agency risk through benchmarking 
or
other means-and the use of multiple vendors is becoming 
a popular
outsourcing strategy.28 I argue that firms are increasingly 
willing to
trade greater monitoring activity for reduced agency 
risk because it is
becoming cheaper to do so. In essence, the 
same forces that are
opening overseas markets are also making it more 
cost-effective to
detect and prevent misbehavior by outsourcing 
partners. And I
believe that this ability to reduce the agency costs 
of outsourcing is
another important factor in the rapid movement 
of activity beyond
firm borders.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explores the 
recent rise of
business outsourcing and relates outsourcing 
to foundational aca-
demic literature on the theory of the firm. Part 1I 
briefly discusses the
agency cost problem and demonstrates how it arises 
in the outsourc-
ing context. Part III then presents and analyzes 
strategies that firms
are using to detect and prevent these agency costs 
of outsourcing-
shedding new light on the structure and terms of 
a typical outsourcing
project. It continues by discussing the more general proposition 
that
falling interaction costs are making it easier, at 
least in some cases, to
contain the agency risks of outsourcing-and that 
this is contributing
to increased relocation of economic activity from 
firm to market. A
brief conclusion summarizes these claims.
I. THE RISE OF BUSINESS OUTSOURCING
A. The Offshoring and Outsourcing Explosion
Relocating economic production is nothing new. 
As transporta-
tion, communication, and other interaction costs 
fall, companies have
continually sought to move business activity to areas 
with cheaper, and
less restrictive, labor markets.
29 Historically, firms focused mostly on
domestic or nearby international expansion. 
Manufacturing activity,
for example, slowly migrated from the northeastern 
United States to
the South and Southwest to take advantage of 
nonunionized labor
and tax benefits.3 0 Similarly, Hollywood started 
filming and editing
movies in Canada, instead of at expensive studios 
in Los Angeles, as
early as the 1940s.3
1
28 See infra Part III.A.2.
29 BRYAN ET AL., supra note 21, at 11-35; FARRELL 
ET AL., supra note 4, at 12;
William I. Huyett & S. Patrick Viguerie, Extreme 
Competition, McKINSEY Q.,Jan. 2005, at
47, 49-52.
30 FARRELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 12.
31 See, e.g., Audrey Droesch, Hollywood North: 
The Impact of Costs and Demarac-
tion Rules on the Runaway Film Industry 4 (May 20, 2002) (unpublished 
manuscript),
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Lately, however, the relocation of economic activity has moved
much further afield. Millions of jobs are flowing to India, China, and
other low-cost producers. 32 The total size of the offshore services mar-
ket33-recently estimated at $12.2 billion for India, $8.6 billion for
Ireland, and over $3.4 billion for China 4 -is expected to jump to
$110 billion by 2010.35 And economic globalization has also taken a
new spot in our public consciousness. According to a recent report by
the McKinsey Global Institute, "Offshoring has rapidly become part of
the everyday social lexicon. Conflicting and sensational reports of
developed-world companies moving jobs to emerging markets... are
now a staple of the news media and political debate."3 6
This transformation spans all sectors of the economy. Perhaps
the highest profile areas of change involve customer call centers,
information technology services, and back-office support. But the
business outsourcing phenomenon is not just about tedious paper-
shuffling efforts or mindless computer programming slots. Overseas
analysts process sophisticated derivative contracts for Wall Street.f 7
Doctors interpret digital CAT scans and x-rays for Western hospitals.38
And molecular biology PhDs discover new drugs for pharmaceutical
firms.3 9 Information technology continues to play a major role in off-
available at http: //www-econ.stanford.edu/academics/honors%5Ftheses.bak/
Droesch.pdf; BPO Goes to Hollywood, KNOWLEDGE@WI-ARTON, Oct. 31, 2006, http://
knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/india/article.cfm?articleid=41 10.
32 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
33 While a great deal of outsourcing has involved manufacturing activity, this Arti-
cle focuses on the more recent phenomenon of services-based outsourcing.
34 FARRELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 13 exhibit 1.
35 NASSCOM-McKINsE' REPORT 2005, supra note 6, at 14.
36 FARRELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 11. The 2004 presidential campaign, in partic-
ular, positioned outsourcing as an important issue, with John Kerry berating "'Bene-
dict Arnold' bosses" on the campaign trail. See, e.g., The Great Hollowing-Out Myth,
ECONOMIST, Feb. 21, 2004, at 27. According to Kiran Karnik, president of the Indian
business lobby NASSCOM, the outsourcing outrage has faded greatly since then-
although renewed political backlash remains a risk to outsourcing vendors. Interview
with Kiran Karnik, President, NASSCOM, in Kolkata, India (Dec. 9, 2005).
37 The Next Wave, supra note 20, at 57 ("J.P. Morgan Chase . .. is to double, to
about 9,000, its staff [in India]. One task for the new recruits is to settle complex
structured-finance and derivative deals, what one insider calls 'some of the most
sophisticated transactions in the world."').
38 Jay Solomon, Traveling Cure: India's New Coup in Outsourcing: Inpatient Care,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2004, at Al.
39 Good Chemistry: Mere Copycats No Longer, Indian Firms are flaunting Their Research
Skills, ECONOMIST, Feb. 4, 2006, at 58 ("Many analysts . . . see a big opportunity for
India as a place for the outsourcing of drug discovery.").
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shore projects, but the work is spreading throughout most industry
sectors. 4
0
Some of this relocated activity is kept under firm control 
through
"captive offshoring" facilities. 4t But there has also been a rapid
increase in "offshore outsourcing"-the movement 
of activity beyond
the borders of the firm.
42 A host of successful companies now take on
the product development, marketing, manufacturing, 
information
technology, and support needs of others.
43 In short, there is a signifi-
cant realignment underway in the optimal scope 
of the firm.
40 In fact, information technology services and 
packaged software are not the sec-
tors of the economy where the most jobs can theoretically 
be outsourced. While a
very high percentage of technology jobs can be performed remotely-due, 
in large
part, to the digital nature of this work-these 
sectors of the economy are relatively
small. Other industry sectors, such as retail or 
healthcare, may have a fewer percent-
age of jobs that can be performed remotely (it's hard to outsource 
a store clerk, for
example), but these industries are so large that. the total 
number of jobs impacted is
theoretically higher. See FARRELL ET AL., supra 
note 4, at 22 exhibit 1.
41 See id. at 15 exhibit 3.
42 Thus, two decisions arise when a firm chooses 
to perform an activity remotely.
First, should the firm perform the work onshore-in 
the country where the product
or service is sold-or should it move the activity 
to an offshore location? Second,
what organizational form should the remote activity 
take? Should the firm continue
to perform the work within its corporate umbrella, 
or should it move the activity
beyond its borders through an outsourcing contract? 
Putting together these two deci-
sions leads to four possible ways to structue a remote 
activity: (1) shared services; (2)
onshore outsourcing; (3) captive offshoring; and (4) offshore 
outsourcing. See id. at
15 exhibit 3, 16. Let me give a quick example of 
each-borrowed from McKinsey's
work in this area. Shared services are simply the onshore 
centralization of a business
activity conducted in several, disparate locations. 
A bank in the Northeast, for exam-
ple, might centralize call center operations for 100 
branches in its large New Jersey
headquarters. See id. at 300-01. Onshore outsourcing 
occurs if the same centralized
activity is conducted by a different firm-the New Jersey 
call center, for example,
might be run by a different company that services several 
banks. See id. Captive off-
shoring moves business activity to another country, 
but keeps it within the legal bor-
ders of the fin. Microsoft's large software development 
site in Hyderabad, India is a
good example of this. See supra note 1. And finally, 
offshore outsourcing transfers
the work to another company overseas. A host of 
service vendors in India-firms like
TCS, Infosys, Wipro, Cognizant, and others-are 
booming as Western companies
export work in this manner. See Now for the Hard Part: A Survey 
of Business in India-
Virtual Champions: India's IT Stars Are Still Rising Fast, 
EcoNoMisT, June 3, 2006, at 4
[hereinafter Virtual Champions]. This Article is primarily concerned 
with the organi-
zational axis and the decision by firms to shift activities 
out of the corporate fold. The
offshore axis is important only as a driver of change-although 
it would be interesting
to consider how agency costs might differ according 
to the geographic location of an
outsourcing project.
43 Estimates from 2001 suggest that outsourcing 
(both onshore and offshore) far
outweighs captive offshoring (although the estimates 
also suggest that offshoring
alone is closely divided between the two organizational 
forms). The volume of out-
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Of course, sending jobs abroad does not always work. Some firms
seem to regret their actions, explaining that they are being forced
against their desire-perhaps by Adam Smith's invisible hand-to
move work overseas.44 Other companies report, after launching an
outsourcing project, that the result is abject failure.45 One recent
study argued that "[i] n the near future, with structural risks that can-
not be fully mitigated, . . . and a multitude of components to man-
age .... outsourcing will likely lose luster for large organizations. ' 46
And even when an outsourcing project succeeds, the vendor may soon
request higher pay to keep workers from hopping jobs.47
Nevertheless, despite this turmoil, business outsourcing contin-
ues to flourish, and most observers expect even greater growth. A
recent report estimates that offshore services will rise to $110 billion
by 2010.48 In India, outsourcing generates nearly five percent of the
country's GDP, and revenues are expected to increase at a compound
annual growth rate of thirty-seven percent through 2010. 4 9 Ninety-five
sourcing transactions approached $240 billion in 2001; captive offshoring volume was
roughly one-tenth as large, at $22 billion. See FARRELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 15
exhibit 3. Domestic shared services are excluded from these estimates. Id.
44 For example, Larry Ellison, CEO of Oracle Corporation, has publicly worried
that Silicon Valley will become another Detroit by 2008. House Comm. on Small Busi-
ness Hearing, supra note 22, at 2. Andy Grove, former CEO and Chairman of Intel, has
expressed similar sentiments: "Given cost and productivity pressures [Intel] has no
choice but to continue sending work abroad .... The US could lose the bulk of its
information technology jobs to overseas competitors in the next decade." Michael
Schroeder & Timothy Appel, Skilled Workers Mount Opposition to Free Trade, Swaying
Politicians, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2003, at Al.
45 Deloitte Consulting, for example, recently published a provocative report
claiming that "outsourcing is an extraordinarily complex process, and the anticipated
benefits often fail to materialize." DELOrrE CONSULTING, supra note 6, at 2. Accord-
ing to this study, the leading causes of failure include hidden costs, inferior quality, a
loss of flexibility, poor planning, and high vendor employee turnover. Id. at 5.
46 Id. at 3.
47 Some of the most popular outsourcing destinations report annual attrition
rates near fifty percent. See, e.g., Busy Signals: Too Many Chiefs, Not Enough Indians,
EcoNoMisT, Sept. 10, 2005, at 60; Growing Pains: At Both High and Low Ends of the
Industry, the Problems of Success, ECONOMIST, Aug. 23, 2003, at 51. The attrition is
largely driven by a rapid increase in wages; workers in the hottest parts of India and
Russia, for example, have seen their salaries grow fifty percent over the past few years.
See Diana Farrell, Smarter Offshoring, HARV. Bus. REV., June 2006, at 85, 86.
48 See NASSCOM-MCKINsEv REPORT 2005, supra note 6, at 14. Many other studies
estimate similarly high levels of growth. See sources cited supra note 6.
49 Virtual Champions, supra note 42, at 4; Now for the Hard Part: A Survey of Business
in India-If in Doubt, Farm It Out: But Outsourcing Firms Are Having Increasing Trouble
Finding Suitable Workers, ECONOMIST, June 3, 2006, at 6 [hereinafter If in Doubt, Farm it
Out].
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percent of Fortune 1000 companies allegedly have 
an offshore out-
sourcing strategy, 50 and professional advisors continue 
to midwife the
change. The top outsourcing vendors amass tremendous 
financial
gains and are hiring thousands of employees each year.
51 One com-
mentator has claimed, more generally, that "[t]he low costs 
and low
risk of outsourcing will accelerate the flow of jobs offshore, force 
com-
panies to look differently at their strategies, and 
change the basis of
competition."52 It is very likely that offshore outsourcing 
will continue
as a major economic trend.
What is causing this growth? And why are the changes 
occurring
so fast? To understand the traditional explanation 
for the rise of out-
sourcing, it is necessary to go back to Ronald Coase 
and the theory of
the firm.
B. Outsourcing and the Theory of the Firm
The decision to outsource is just the flip-side of the decision 
to
conduct a given activity within the firm. The 
notable feature of an
outsourcing project, over other market transactions, is simply that 
it
moves an activity previously conducted within 
the firm beyond the
corporate borders. How, then, should a company 
decide whether to
perform the activity internally or to farm it out 
through an external
contract?
This, of course, is the question famously posed 
by Coase in 1937
and debated by legal and economic scholars ever 
since.5 3 The litera-
ture on the theory of the firm is vast, and I will 
not try to review it
here.54 But a few points are worth raising in relation 
to business out-
sourcing. First, it is important to recognize that 
in a world with per-
fect markets and costless contracting there would 
be no need to
organize economic activity within a firm.
55 It would be better to write
50 PHILLIP J. HATCH, VENTORO OFFSHORE 2005 
RESEARCH 12 (2005), available at
http://www.ventoro.com/O
f s h or e 2 0
05 R e s e a rc h F i n d i n g s'p df .
51 In India, for example, leading IT outsourcing vendors recently announced
annual revenue growth rates of thirty percent 
or more and annual hiring plans of up
to 30,500 employees. See Virtual Champions, supra 
note 42, at 4-5. Nandan Nilekani,
CEO of Infosys Technologies, says it took his 
firm "23 years to become a $1 billion
company, and 23 months to double that." Id. 
at 5.
52 Davenport, supra note 23, at 102.
53 Coase, supra note 9, at 390 ("Our task is to attempt 
to discover why a firm
emerges at all in a specialised exchange economy.").
54 For an excellent review of scholarship in this 
area, including a comprehensive
bibliography through 1999, see NicolaiJ. Foss et 
al., The Thery of the Firm, in ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 27, § 5610, at 631-58.
55 Id. at 633-34.
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a series of detailed contracts on the open market for the inputs and
activities needed to create new goods-thus enabling a producer to
tap into the decentralized and disciplined price system of the mar-
ket.56 Essentially, an entrepreneur could simply stitch together a "vir-
tual" business venture by grabbing inputs and services through
complete contracts covering every possible state of the world.
But we do not live in a world of perfect markets or costless con-
tracting, and one of Coase's great insights was that performing some
activities within a firm might reduce the transaction costs of using
external market pricing mechanisms. 57 Production costs are likely to
be higher when business is conducted within the firm-because the
activity is walled off from the relentless pricing pressure that comes
with well-functioning markets. 53 Yet these greater production costs
might nevertheless be worth paying if a firm can save even more by
avoiding other costs related to arms-length transactions.
Coase was a little vague on the exact nature of these other costs,59
however, and much of the literature since then discusses the transac-
tion costs (broadly defined) of using a market and how these costs
might be avoided when an activity is conducted within a firm. Schol-
ars have developed a range of cost possibilities, and I will trace just a
few ideas here. First, and perhaps most obviously, forming an agree-
ment costs money. It can be expensive to negotiate and draft detailed
contracts-especially if parties need to include clauses that govern
arcane contingencies.60 One potential benefit of centralized firm
56 Id.
57 Coase, supra note 9, at 390-91.
58 In other words, a firm that does everything itself will probably pay more for
most of its economic inputs-after all it is unlikely to be the lowest cost producer of
everything. Nevertheless, the firm may still choose to keep control of many activities
to guarantee a source of supply (thus protecting against a form of market failure) or
to cut the transaction costs (broadly defined) of securing the input. The retailer 7-
Eleven, for example, was famous for owning the cows used to make milk that it sold in
its stores. Mark Gotfredson et al., Strategic Sourcing: From Periphery to the Core, HARv.
Bus. REV., Feb. 2005, at 132, 135.
59 See Foss et al., supra note 54, § 5610, at 640 (describing Oliver Williamson's
claim that Coase's basic story long awaited "operationalization").
60 These costs arise, most obviously, from the time and effort required to work
through contractual details. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND Eco-
NOMICS 211-14 (4th ed. 2004); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Or LAW 299-301 (2004); Richard Craswell, Contract Law: General Theories, in ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 27, § 4000, at 1-2; Alan Schwartz & Robert
E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 594-95
(2003). But the parties may face other expenses if bounded rationality at the time of
contracting prevents them from delineating how certain issues should be handled,
even though it would be in their joint interests to do so. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisen-
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control, then, is the reduction of price discovery, negotiation, and
contracting costs arising under market transactions. As the theory
goes, moving economic activity into a firm might reduce some transac-
tion costs by replacing them with ex post governance mechanisms.6 1
Instead of bothering to write a detailed contract, a firm maintains
enough discretion over the activity to make the optimal decision
later-if and when a future uncertainty emerges.62 Thus, depending
on the exact nature of the economic activity, and the likely complexity
of transaction costs, a firm will choose between markets and firm
"hierarchies" to secure the input.63
Over time, more nuanced descriptions of contracting transaction
costs have emerged, providing additional rationales for the decision
to place economic activity within the firm. Oliver Williamson devel-
oped a theory involving relation-specific investments-or assets that
have high value to a specific user but lower value to everyone else.64
berg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REv. 211, 214-16
(1995); Herbert A. Simon, A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship, 19
ECONOMETRICA 293, 294-95 (1951).
61 See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 700-09 (1986).
62 Coase's early work on the subject similarly recognized that keeping control of
an activity might allow firms to capitalize on future uncertainty. See Coase, supra note
9, at 391-92.
63 See Foss et al., supra note 54, § 5610, at 635-42. This distinction between firms
and markets faces some criticism, however, because it fails to account for the fact that
workers within a firm can often exercise market power by exiting the organization.
See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 Am. ECON. REv. 777, 782-83 (1972).
64 In a series of important articles, Williamson demonstrated how placing these
assets into a single firm could remove costs that might arise through opportunistic
behavior. More specifically, if the economic activity involving these assets is not
lumped into a firm, a contractual counterparty might seek to expropriate some of the
unique economic surplus from the relation-specific investment. See OLIvER E. WIL.
LIAMSON, MARYETS AND HIERARCHIES 82-105 (1975); Oliver E. Williamson, The Logic of
Economic Organization, 4 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 65, 76-83 (1988); Oliver E. Williamson,
The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REv.
112, 115-17 (1971). More recent work has linked the rise of the corporate entity to
its ability to allow joint owners (shareholders) to "lock-in" or commit assets to a ven-
ture without facing a risk that their co-owners will behave opportunistically. See Mar-
garet M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in
the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REv. 387, 423-41 (2003); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn
A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REv. 247, 259-65 (1999).
But see Larry E. Ribstein, Should History Lock In Lock-in?, 7-9, 17-19 (II. Law and Econ.
Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. LE06-005, 2006), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=883648 (arguing that there are economic costs to lock-in and question-
ing this historical account for the rise of the corporation). Similar logic involving
relation-specific assets and investments has also been used to demonstrate the need
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Sanford Grossman, Oliver Hart, John Moore, and others developed a
"property rights theory of the firm," under which assets should be
owned by the entity making the most important, relation-specific
investment.65 More recently, Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales
have extended this theory beyond physical assets by arguing that firms
can control access to all assets-including specialized human capi-
tal.66 And certainly there are other possible ways to articulate the ben-
efits of using firm hierarchies over markets.67
While these theories differ in their exact specification of the costs
or distortions that might arise with market transactions-and thus the
rationale for placing production within a firm-they all provide an
explanation for the rise of outsourcing in a dynamic world. Each the-
ory implies that the optimal location of economic activity is the result
of a careful balance between production cost savings from using mar-
kets, and transaction cost savings (again, broadly defined) from using
firms. Thus, for instance, under a property fights theory of the firm,
production will continue to take place within a firm until the marginal
benefit from avoiding counterparty opportunism is outweighed by
higher production costs. In other words, we would expect a firm to
optimize the cost of producing each input against the transaction
costs of a market contract in order to decide exactly where to erect
the firm's borders.68 In a static world, this balance should hold, and
the division of activity between firm and market would be roughly
constant.
But because we live in a dynamic world, both production costs
and transaction costs for various activities can increase or decrease as
new technologies or suppliers come online. This suggests that the
borders of a firm will continue to change as the underlying tension
for contract law to provide a mechanism for parties to inexorably bind themselves
through promise-when they do choose to incur the transaction costs of a market
exchange. See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra note 60, at 559-62.
65 As the theory runs, this allows the economic actor with the most to lose to
retain residual control-and thus guard against opportunism by the other parties-
when it is difficult or prohibitively expensive to write contracts that govern key contin-
gencies. See Grossman & Hart, supra note 61, at 700-10; Oliver Hart, An Economist's
Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1757, 1771-74 (1989); Oliver
Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119,
1131-39 (1990).
66 See Raghuram G. Rajan& Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q.J.
ECON. 387, 388 (1998).
67 For instance, firms may wish to produce critical inputs on their own to protect
against monopoly or oligopoly supply markets.
68 See Coase, supra note 9, at 395.
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between production costs and transaction costs oscillates.69 And
indeed, we do observe a constant stream of corporate reorganization
through buyouts, mergers, spin-offs, and long term outsourcing
contracts.
Viewed in this light, incomplete contracting theories of the firm
provide a logical explanation for the growth of business outsourcing.
If barriers to securing economic inputs via remote markets drop rap-
idly-perhaps due to technological, regulatory, or other factors-
then we would expect the historical balance between firm and market
to change. Increased supply will boost the gains from procuring
inputs on the market, causing some firms to outsource activity beyond
the corporate borders.70 And certainly there is plenty of evidence that
shifting activity to overseas markets can result in significantly cheaper
production costs. 7
1
The unlocking of remote production, and the corresponding rise
in economic globalization, has been linked to a variety of factors.
First, communication costs have plummeted in response to new tech-
nologies and a rapidly expanding infrastructure. 72 Other technologi-
cal advances-including faster processing power, better compression
algorithms, and cheaper data storage-make it easier to digitize eco-
nomic activity. 73 This digitization allows firms to carve off business
processes from the value chain and perform them anywhere in the
world. And finally, the very nature of these business processes may
also be changing as companies and industry consortiums push for
greater standardization.7 4 Common standards make it easier for firms
to choose the sequence of their business processes, measure how well
each activity is performed, and manage how these processes are con-
69 SeeJACKSON ET nA.., supra note 8, at 227.
70 The analysis is, admittedly, a little more tricky than this because a firm might
still enjoy some of these cost savings by setting up captive offshoring ventures where
they can keep control of the activity. See supra note 42. Thus the relevant question is
whether the transaction costs of using the market have fallen faster than the costs of
conducting captive offshoring. Recent growth in outsourcing deals suggest that this
might be true in some contexts. See, e.g., Sankaranarayanan & Sundararajan, supra
note 21, at 9-12 (modeling the effects of lower interaction costs on interfirm and
intrafirm activity). For a specific example where this appears to be the case, see infra
notes 212-18 and accompanying text.
71 See infra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
72 See, e.g., BRYAN FT AL., supra note 21, at 22-28; FARRELL ET AL., supra note 4, at
14; FRIEDMAN, supra note 20, at 59-76.
73 BRYAN ET AL., supra note 21, at 23-24.
74 See Davenport, supra note 23, at 107.
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ducted over time.75 In short, there are reasons to believe that it is
becoming easier to source production around the world.
There is also ample evidence that production costs are much
lower in developing economies. For example, a software programmer
earning sixty dollars per hour in the United States may earn just six
dollars in India.76 Similarly, a data entry worker earning twenty dol-
lars in the United States commands two dollars in India. 77 Raw wage
differences probably exaggerate the cost savings because offshoring
requires higher communications costs and greater management infra-
structure. 78 But even taking these new costs into account, it has been
estimated that using emerging labor markets can cut some costs in
half.
7 9
And the economic benefits of offshoring go beyond labor arbi-
trage. Cheaper production gives firms new options for structuring the
flow of business activities. This may open opportunities to improve
efficiency by making different trade-offs between labor and capital
inputs. Changing the sequence of business processes, for example,
may increase overall labor costs but lower total costs through higher
capital productivity.80 Similarly, firms may also use outsourcing as a
way to increase revenues. For example, cheaper labor allows some
companies to pursue delinquent accounts receivable balances that
75 Id. For greater discussion of these benefits, see infra notes 206-11 and accom-
panying text.
76 See MCKINsEY GLOBAL INST., OFFSHORING 1 (2003), available at http://
www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/win-win-game.asp.
77 Id. These estimates may not reflect recent wage inflation. See Farrell, supra
note 47, at 92.
78 Id. at 2.
79 Id. Of course, the cost of production in each location must also be adjusted
for any difference in quality. Some firms refuse to move work overseas, claiming that
the lower quality of the work more than offsets any cost savings. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN,
supra note 20, at 36-38 (presenting examples where firms insist on using domestic
outsourcing). On the other hand, in certain contexts, the quality of offshored work
may be higher than that of developed economies. For example, the United States
Department of Defense (DOD) has created the Capability Maturity Model (CMM)
standard as a quality standard for information technology work. Firms who do not
conduct business with the DOD largely ignore the standard, but many IT firms in
India have seized upon CMM ratings as a way to demonstrate their quality-and have
successfully obtained level five awards (the highest level of certification). See Ravi
Aron, A View From the Developing World, KNOWLEI)GE@WHARTON, Mar. 25, 2004,
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=862. Some regions have
recently developed reputations for very high quality work in certain industries-such
as China in wireless communications and Bangalore, India in software development.
80 See Agrawal et al., supra note 23, at 30-33.
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they have previously been forced to ignore.8 1 Finally, firms may be
able to develop new products for lower income countries or offer new
support services that were previously uneconomical.8 2
According to the conventional story, then, a variety of forces have
shifted the tipping point between in-house activity and external mar-
ket activity by opening remote sources of supply. These low cost mar-
kets unlock economic gains, most immediately through price
arbitrage, but also via new revenue opportunities or reengineered bus-
iness processes. This story makes economic sense, it is the one given
by most firms when they announce an outsourcing decision, and I
certainly would not dispute that lower production costs are a major
factor underlying the rise of business outsourcing.
But if the economic benefits of offshore outsourcing are so great,
then why haven't we seen even more business activity move overseas?
A recent estimate suggests, after all, that fewer than three percent of
eligible jobs have been outsourced.83 One answer, as many executives
can tell you,8 4 is that moving economic activity out of a firm often
creates some problems of its own. It becomes harder to ensure that
the work is being performed correctly, or that vendors are expending
adequate effort. Or vendors may be taking unknown risks as they con-
duct operations, risks that an outsourcing firm would never feel com-
fortable taking itself. More generally-and as the next Part will
discuss-business outsourcing projects give rise to an agency cost
problem.
II. A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE AGENCY COST PROBLEM
Many decades ago, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means famously
argued that economic centralization comes with a price.8 It is often
costly-and not fully possible-to prevent parties from taking self-
interested actions when they are empowered to make decisions that
affect other people's property. In other words, the very act of deputiz-
ing someone else to run your affairs raises incentives for suboptimal
behavior. This Part briefly summarizes these economic distortions,
collectively termed agency costs, and demonstrates how they can
occur in a business outsourcing transaction.
81 Id. at 34.
82 Id. at 34-35.
83 See FARRELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 25-28; supra note 5 and accompanying text.
84 See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
85 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 10, at 310.
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A. Shirking, Gluttony, Entrenchment, and Risk
The agency cost problem arises whenever one 
party (the agent)
has discretionary power to make decisions that 
affect the wealth of
another (the principal). 86 The trouble can really be blamed 
on asym-
metrical information, If it cost nothing for a 
principal to observe and
understand how an agent's actions link to 
ultimate economic out-
comes, then the agent would have no reason 
to behave differently
than the principal. 87 But it is often difficult to 
know whether a poor
outcome is caused by an agent's behavior or 
by external conditions.
The world is complex, and results cannot necessarily 
be inferred from
inputs. Agents may therefore choose to capitalize 
on this haziness by
using discretionary power to benefit themselves-at 
the expense of
uninformed principals.
What type of behavior underlies the agency cost 
problem? There
are at least four broad areas of concern: (1) insufficient 
effort or
shirking; (2) lavish compensation or self-dealing; (3) 
entrenchment;
and (4) poor risk management.
88
The easiest way to illustrate each type of distortion 
is to consider
an agent hired to invest a billionaire's money. 
How might she person-
ally benefit at the rich principal's expense? 
First, the agent might
shirk by making investment decisions without 
conducting adequate
due diligence. For example, she may just throw a dart at 
a list of
stocks instead of performing careful research 
on the best place to
invest the money.89 Second, in the absence of 
legal protection, the
agent may take a variety of self-dealing actions 
to boost her compensa-
tion-things like investing in firms that kick-back 
bribes or traveling
to exotic investor conferences.
90 Third, the agent might make bad
86 The agency cost problem has been discussed 
extensively in the legal and eco-
nomic literature. The foundation for much 
of this work can be found in id. and
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 12. A full bibliography 
is beyond the scope of this
Article; additional background on agency theory can 
be found in Kenneth J. Arrow,
The Economics of Agency, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS 37 (John W. 
Pratt & Richard J.
Zeckhauser eds., 1985); Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency 
Theory: An Assessment and
Review, 14 ACAD. MGM-r. REV. 57 (1989); Eugene F. Fama, 
Agency Problems and the The-
ory of the Firm, 88J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980); SanfordJ. Grossman 
& Oliver D. Hart, An
Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem, 51 ECONOMETRICA 7 (1983).
87 Arrow, supra note 86, at 43-45.
88 See TIROLE, supra note 13, at 16-17.
89 In the literature, shirking is understood to 
occur not only when agents work
few hours, but also when they spend time on less important, 
but easier to perform,
activities. Id. at 16.
90 This category of agency costs is beloved by 
the business media, which thrives
on reports of business excesses. Yet some have theorized 
that excessive compensation
and self-dealing may actually be one of the smaller 
categories of agency costs. See
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decisions solely to protect her job. For instance, she may invest in
arcane derivative contracts-not because these are a sound invest-
ment for the principal, but rather because the net position is compli-
cated, making it difficult for the billionaire to fire the agent.91 Finally,
the agent may take action that is either too conservative or too risky in
order to achieve personal aims. For example, she may invest the
money in a risk-free savings account, instead of in stocks or bonds, to
protect her job by never losing money.92 On the other hand, in cer-
tain situations, an agent may engage in extremely risky behavior that
harms the principal. For example, if the money manager faces the
threat of imminent termination for poor investment performance, she
might be willing to place a net present value negative bet in order to
juice her returns, or "gamble for resurrection." 9
Principals are often aware of these problems, and they may take
steps to counter potential abuses. For example, they may demand fre-
quent meetings or reports in order to understand how an agent uses
her discretion. Or a principal may hire an independent third party to
monitor an agent in an attempt to safeguard that the agent acts in the
principal's best interest.94 The principal may also negotiate contract
provisions that seek to align the interests of both parties. 95 In some
cases, agents may also wish to make bonding expenditures to prove
that they will not behave opportunistically. 96 But all of these actions
cost money, and ultimately they will not fully remove the information
Beyond Irrelevance: Why Companies' Financial Structure Matters After All, ECONOMIST, Feb.
11, 2006, at 74.
91 In the corporate context, notable entrenchment strategies involve manipulat-
ing performance metrics to obscure poor results or resisting mergers that might lead
to management turnover. See TIROLE, supra note 13, at 17; Andrei Shleifer & Robert
W. Vishny, Management Entrenchment: The Case of Manager-Specific Investments, 25 J. FIN.
ECON. 123, 134-36 (1989).
92 Similarly, corporate agents are often criticized for steering decisions toward
excessively safe projects. TtROLE, supra note 13, at 17.
93 Id. For example, in desperate times, the agent may be tempted to take the
billionaire's money to Las Vegas and place it on the roulette wheel (a negative net
present value transaction-a wager on black, for instance, earns an expected ninety-
four cents for every dollar bet). If the gamble pays off, she may keep her job; and if it
fails, she would have been fired anyway. In analogous contexts, an agent might be
willing to take much more risk than a principal.
94 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 12, at 325.
95 See Arrow, supra note 86, at 43-44; Eisenhardt, supra note 86, at 59-60; Fama,
supra note 86, at 292.
96 SeeJensen & Meckling, supra note 12, at 308 ("[lIn some situations it will pay
the agent to expend resources ... to guarantee that he will not take certain actions
which would harm the principal or to ensure that the principal will be compensated if
he does take such actions."). Examples of these bonding costs include contractual
[VOL. 82:3
976 NOTRE DAEit L -- VIEW
asymmetries that exist between agent and principal
. 7 A complete
understanding of the agency cost problem, therefore, 
includes these
incremental monitoring and bonding expenses, along 
with the fore-
gone economic value from suboptimal 
agent decisions.98
Agency cost theories have been raised most often 
in the corpo-
rate context, and they have come to dominate much 
of the scholar-
ship in this area.99 This work models the corporation 
as a "nexus of
contracts" between many different economic participants, 
including
equity investors, debt investors, directors, officers, 
employees, suppli-
ers, and customers. It then considers how agency 
distortions might
affect the actions of these different parties.
Following the lead of Jensen and Meckling, the typical 
focus is on
agency costs arising from the relationship between 
shareholders and
managers. 0 0 Shareholders, with a residual equity interest, 
are viewed
as the principals. The various executives running the 
firm-primarily
the directors and top managers-are viewed as agents. 
The analogy is
not perfect, t01 but it does have some explanatory 
and predictive
promises to hire third party auditors, explicit insurance 
against malfeasance by the
agent, or contractual limits on the agent's decision 
making power. Id. at 323.
97 This is true because there are an infinite number of 
potential contingencies,
each of which might provide an avenue for agents 
to steer decisions in their favor.
Indeed, the only way to remove these distortions completely 
is to transfer full owner-
ship of the property to the controlling agent. See, 
e.g., id. at 312-13, 316-17; Robert
H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 
621, 637 (2005).
98 SeeJensen & Meckling, supra note 12, at 308 
(defining agency costs as the sum
of the principal's monitoring costs, the agent's bonding 
costs, and the residual loss
measured as the "dollar equivalent of the reduction 
in welfare experienced by the
principal" as a result of divergent agent interests).
99 See Robert P. Bartlett, Managing Risk on a $25 Million Bet: 
Venture Capital, Agency
Costs, and the False Dichotomy of the Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REv. 37, 
48 (2006) (noting
that agency cost models "define [I the primary analytical framework 
used in contem-
porary corporate scholarship"); Sitkoff, supra note 97, at 623 ("Agency 
cost theories of
the firm dominate the modern literature of corporate 
law and economics.").
100 For example, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel 
Fischel take this angle in their
1991 analysis of corporate law-essentially arguing 
that corporate stakeholders will
take agency cost distortions into account when structuring 
their economic relation-
ships. See FRANK H. EAsTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, 
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 1-39 (1991).
101 Recent work has argued that the principal-agent 
paradigm is problematic in
the corporate context. For example, corporate directors 
are not agents of the share-
holders-at least not in the legal sense of the term-because 
shareholders lack the
power to control or fire directors. See Margaret 
M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Specific
Investment: Explaining Anomalies in Corporate Law 27-28 
(Vanderbilt Law Sch., Law &
Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 05-26, 
2005), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=8 19
3 6 5 (suggesting that the principal-agent model of the corporation
should be replaced with a theory that a primary role 
of the firm is to "lock-in" investor
....... r AAr I Vll W
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power.1 0 2 In fact, balancing the Coasean benefits of centralized cor-
porate control 0 3 against the resulting agency costs has become a piv-
otal tension for corporate law scholars.104 Important work has also
surfaced in the debt financing context-where the lender is viewed as
principal and the borrowing firm is viewed as agent 0 -- and in other
capital structure decisions.10 6
Agency costs might also arise, however, between other corporate
stakeholders.10 7 And business outsourcing, in particular, offers an
intriguing perspective on the problem.
B. The Agency Costs of Business Outsourcing
A business outsourcing project will sometimes transfer corporate
assets and employees to an outsourcing vendor-who will continue to
use these resources to conduct economic activity on behalf of the cli-
ent. " 8 In other cases, the existing assets and workers are replaced
capital); Blair & Stout, supra note 64, at 290-91. But this argument does not mean
that agency cost theories of the firm are no longer relevant. Blair & Stout, supra, at 38
("[TI he principal-agent model still has great influence .... "); Ribstein, supra note 64
(using agency theory to assess capital lock-in in a corporation).
102 See TIRoLE, supra note 13, at 15-43. For example, the work here has supported
(and later critiqued) the use of stock options and other incentive-based compensation
schemes for corporate executives. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 13, at 121-32;
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 12, at 31 0-11 :Jensen & Murphy, supra note 14, at 243;
Schizer, supra note 14, at 448-49. Agency theory has also led to extensive normative
debate about the appropriate division between board and shareholder control. See
Bainbridge, supra note 18, at 616-27; Bebchuk, supra note 18, at 850-92.
103 See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
104 SeeJACKSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 227.
105 Much of the discussion focuses on the distortions that arise when a borrowing
firm (the agent) controls the money of a creditor (the principal). Problems arising
between a principal-lender and manager-agent are also explored. See Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 12, at 337-39. In both contexts, the analysis differs from share-
holder-CEO agency models because borrowers are not legally required to extend fidu-
ciary duties to lenders. Thus most of the techniques for mitigating agency costs are
contractual in nature. See Amihud et al., supra note 17, at 454-56; Kahan & Yermack,
supra note 17, at 138.
106 The structure of venture capital finance, for instance, offers a rich context for
transaction cost economics and agency theory. See, e.g., PAUL GoMpErs & JosH LER-
NER, THE VErURE CAPITAL CYCLE 174-75 (2004); Bartlett, supra note 99, at 48-61;
Michael Klausner & Kate Litvak, What Economists Have Taught Us About Venture Capital
Contracting, in BRIDGING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCING GAP 59 (Michael Whincop
ed., 2001); William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organi-
zations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473, 493-503 (1990).
107 SeeJensen & Meckling, supra note 12, at 309.
108 For example, a large outsourcing project in 2002 transferred about 4000
employees fromJP Morgan (the client) to IBM (the outsourcing vendor). See Charles
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
with those of the vendor. But the defining feature of an outsourcing
transaction is that a firm contracts with another entity to take over
activity that was previously produced inside the firm.
Outsourcing deals thus generate agency risk under a very familiar
logic: the entity that controls a business activity does not ultimately
"own" the economic result. Just like a CEO manages the property of
shareholders-or like a borrower manages the money of a lender-an
outsourcing vendor manages the business activity of an outsourcing
firm. 109 This places the vendor in an agency position, where it might
have incentives to cut corners, take excessive risks, or engage in other
forms of self-dealing. Unless resources are spent on monitoring,
bonding, or other contractual protection, business outsourcing
breeds a host of distorted incentives.
For example, in a typical call center outsourcing project, the ven-
dor decides who to hire and how it will train these employees. Simi-
larly, it decides when to replace aging capital with more efficient
technology. And the vendor takes charge of quality control to ensure
that employees are polite on the phones and adept at solving callers'
problems. But the outsourcing client takes the fallout from many of
these choices. If the vendor hires rude callers who chase away loyal
customers, then the client loses business. If the caller misses obvious
sales opportunities, then the client foregoes the revenue.
Of course, the outsourcing vendor might ultimately be accounta-
ble for shoddy work if the client decides not to renew a contract or if
Forelle, Bank Scraps Dollars 5bn IBM IT Deal, FIN. TiMES, Sep. 16, 2004, at 32. When
the project collapsed a few years later, all 4000 employees were moved back to JP
Morgan. id.
109 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 12, at 325. The analysis differs slightly from the
typical corporate model because the outsourcing firm, as a whole, is viewed as princi-
pal and the outsourcing vendor is seen as agent. This is analogous to the agency
framework used in lending transactions, which also views entire firms as agent and
principal: the lending party is viewed as principal, and the borrowing firm is viewed as
agent. See supra note 17. It is interesting to note that more sophisticated models
might consider agency distortions arising between multiple corporate stakeholders-
including suppliers, owners, managers, and the like. Robert Bartlett, for example, has
recently demonstrated how agency distortions can occur simultaneously in the corpo-
rate context-between shareholder and manager, and between shareholder and
shareholder. See Bartlett, supra note 99, at 56-61. One possible extension of this
Article, therefore, would involve a more detailed look inside outsourcing firms and
vendor firms to consider agency distortions among other stakeholders. For example,
an outsourcing firm's managers might have distorted incentives to outsource too
much activity (as a form of shirking) or too little activity (as a way to preserve corpo-
rate complexity and their jobs). Similarly, there are likely to be complex incentives
between an outsourcing vendor's employees and managers.
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word gets out to other potential clients that this 
vendor shirks. 110 But
punishment will only be meted out if clients 
become aware that the
vendor is engaged in selfish behavior. Most 
outsourcing relationships
are rife with asymmetrical information, 
and the client is unlikely to
guard against-or even know about-every 
potential abuse.
Indeed, any of the previously mentioned agency 
problems might
occur in an outsourcing relationship."' 
Shirking may be the most
obvious risk; when the principal is far away, 
vendors may be tempted
to ease off just a little bit.11 2 But an outsourcing vendor 
might also
pursue excessive compensation through 
a myriad of techniques. For
example, it might write cost-plus contracts 
and buy fancy equipment.
Or it might write fixed-price contracts yet 
hire unskilled labor. Simi-
larly, a vendor may try to avoid meaningful 
competition for contract
renewals-perhaps by setting up excessively 
confusing documentation
of their business processes.1
13 Finally, vendors may incur unwarranted
risks in their project execution-risks that the outsourcing 
principal
would never tolerate if it kept control of 
the activity.
Consider, for example, a recent incident 
at the prestigious Uni-
versity of California San Francisco (UCSF) Medical 
Center. Near the
end of 2003, an employee at UCSF was startled 
by a threatening email
from a woman in Pakistan named Lubna 
Baloch. 1 4 Ms. Baloch
wanted help collecting money from someone 
named Tom Spires, who
had apparently hired her to transcribe verbal 
doctor notes for UCSF
patient medical files. 'Your patient records 
are out in the open to be
exposed," the email started. "[Slo you better 
track that person and
make him pay my dues or otherwise I will expose 
all the voice files and
110 The corporate agency literature considers 
similar questions by asking whether
a CEO's desire to renew her contract, or to take 
a CEO position at another firm,
might serve as a check on opportunistic behavior. 
See, e.g., Fama, supra note 86, at
292 ("The manager of a firm, like the coach of any team, 
may not suffer any immedi-
ate gain or loss in current wages from the current 
performance of his team, but the
success or failure of the team impacts his future 
wages, and this gives the manager a
stake in the success of the team.").
11 See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying 
text.
112 Jamie Dimon, the high-profile CEO of JP 
Morgan Chase, has been known to
criticize business outsourcing for this reason. In 
his words, "when you're outsourc-
ing. . . people don't care that much. We want 
patriots, not mercenaries." Shawn
Tully, In This Corner! Jamie Dimon, FORTUNE, 
Apr. 3, 2006, at 64.
113 Outsourcing clients often seek to minimize 
this problem by negotiating coop-
eration clauses requiring vendors to help 
transition projects to new firms in the event
of termination. But these terms are not 
freely given, and presumably a vendor will
charge more-or demand some other benefit-in 
exchange for cooperation rights.
114 See David Lazarus, Looking Offshore: Outsourced UCSF 
Notes Highlight Privacy Risk,
S.F. CHRON., Mar. 28, 2004, at Al.
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patient records of [two different] UCSF campuses on the Internet."
As a chilling exclamation point, she attached voice recordings and full
text copies of private discharge summaries for two UCSF patients. 1 5
The message was both disturbing and puzzling. Disturbing for
the obvious reasons, and puzzling because UCSF had outsourced the
transcription of medical records to a nearby company in the Bay
Area-not to an overseas vendor.' 16 No one had heard of Tom
Spires, and UCSF wondered whether these threats were for real.
As UCSF investigated the situation, it found that the medical tran-
scription work had been subcontracted from the Bay Area vendor to a
woman in Florida.' 1 7 She had passed it on to Tom Spires,' 18 who had
finally sent the assignment on to Ms. Baloch in Pakistan. When Tom
Spires stopped paying for the work, Ms. Baloch decided to threaten
UCSF to recover her fees. Ultimately, UCSF paid her for the work,
Ms. Baloch rescinded her threats, and the sensitive medical files were
not exposed. 119
Yet while the worst outcome was avoided, the Lubna Baloch story
still offers a haunting collection of outsourcing agency costs. First, the
woman in Florida-and perhaps also the Bay Area vendor-shirked
on their performance responsibilities by sending the work elsewhere
instead of transcribing the medical files themselves. 120 Similarly, both
agents seemed negligent in their subcontractor selection process and
failed to supervise the work as closely as UCSF would have preferred.
In addition, the Florida vendor engaged in self-dealing by sending the
work overseas and pocketing the wage arbitrage herself. And this
introduced risks that UCSF appeared unwilling to take: The medical
center was comfortable sharing sensitive information with domestic
outsourcing vendors, but it may not have wanted to release medical
records to a small, international vendor.' 21
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Complicating matters even further, it is uncertain whether Tom Spires really
exists or whether he is a fictional person established by the woman in Florida to hide
her efforts to send the medical information outside of the United States. See id.
119 Id.
120 Apparently the Bay Area vendor's contract with UCSF allowed it to subcontract
the work to other firms-as long as it was performed in the United States. Id. Thus,
any shirking by the Bay Area vendor would come from their failure to manage where
the work was conducted-that is, spending its time on easy actions instead of impor-
tant ones. See supra note 89.
121 Part of UCSF's reluctance to move work overseas may have been caused by
federal legislation affecting the use and treatment of personally identifiable health
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Of course, agency problems of this sort might arise in any long-
term contract involving asymmetrical information. 22 The regular
supplier of raw materials for a manufacturing company, for instance,
could be viewed as an agent because the quality of its inputs will affect
the manufacturer's final product. Similarly, a firm signing a long-
term sales or distribution contract faces risks that the distributor will
not take sensible efforts to move its products. 2-1 It is particularly
interesting to study agency problems in the outsourcing context, how-
ever, because it sheds new light on the way that firms are organizing
their economic activity in a rapidly changing world.1 24
Previous scholarship has recognized the agency costs of business
outsourcing, 2 5 but most research deals with theoretical models of
optimal contract design126 or with technical, practitioner-oriented
care information. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42
U.S.C. § 1320a-7c (2000).
122 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 12, at 327-29.
123 This is one reason why large food companies sometimes hire their own
employees to stock and organize grocery store shelves. Or, to take a related example,
the agency problem is sometimes illustrated by the relationship between a principal
who is selling a home and the realtor marketing the property. See EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra note 100, at 91; Sitkoff, supra note 97, at 636-37. Selling agents may
refuse to take worthwhile efforts to increase the final selling price of a home because
they are compensated with just a small percentage of the profits. Id.
124 A further reason to study agency costs in the outsourcing context relates to the
fact that agents take over chunks of business activity formerly conducted by their prin-
cipals. This means that principals might be especially mindful of agency risk-espe-
cially if previous experience in the activity reduces cognitive biases that limit
recognition of potential agency distortions. If so, outsourcing principals may have a
better sense of what good agent behavior looks like, allowing them to structure a
contract more carefully or to keep a sharp eye open for suboptimal decisions. See
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
185 Sci. 1124, 1130 (1974). For general discussions of cognitive biases in the eco-
nomic analysis of law, see Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Eco-
nomics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1489-1508 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S.
Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Eco-
nomics, 88 CAL. L. Ruv. 1051, 1084-102 (2000).
125 Jensen and Meckling even alluded to supplier agency risk in their seminal 1976
article. SeeJensen & Meckling, supra note 12, at 310.
126 See, e.g., Sankaranarayanan & Sundararajan, supra note 21, at 3 (modeling out-
sourcing agency costs as one factor in the decision to conduct activity within the firm
in light of falling interaction costs); 0. Zeynep Ak in et al., Call Center Outsourcing
Contract Design and Choice (Oct. 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/-fdvl/bio/OUT31-1004.pdf (formally exploring
several co-sourcing structures in the call-center context); Francis Xavier, Abstract,
Determinants of Inter Firm Contractual Relations: A Case of Indian Software Industry (Univ.
of Hyderabad, Dep't of Econ. Working Paper Series, 2005), http://ssrn.com/abstract
=858344 (assessing theories of optimal outsourcing contract terms); Conglei Zhang et
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advice.127 There has been surprisingly little work offering a descrip-
tive account of outsourcing contracts and the strategies that parties
take to mitigate agency risk.
Yet this analysis is important because outsourcing firms do find it
worthwhile to seek contractual protection against agent misbehavior.
As in other agency contexts, an outsourcing principal will negotiate a
variety of structures and terms to monitor and prevent vendor abuses.
And, as the next Part will illustrate, these methods can be especially
intriguing because firms often seem willing to make exceptional
efforts to solve the agency cost problem.
III. MITIGATING AGENCY RISK IN THE BUSINESS
OUTSOURCING RELATIONSHIP
No matter how hard they try, parties establishing an outsourcing
relationship cannot write a perfect contract. Asymmetrical informa-
tion will persist, and agents might take advantage of unexpected
events to secure personal gains at the principal's expense. But the
firms can-and do-take steps to detect and prevent agency risk.
This Part first shows how the structure and terms of a typical outsourc-
ing project operate to mitigate the agency cost problem. It then dis-
cusses the more general proposition that falling interaction costs are
making it easier to pursue these strategies to drive down the agency
costs of outsourcing. Taken together, this work offers a secondary
explanation-beyond garnering access to cheap production mar-
kets-for the contemporary rise of business outsourcing.
A. Strategies to Minimize Agency Costs
Outsourcing projects are exceptionally complex, and, as with
other major corporate transactions, it can be difficult to generalize
broad principles from specific deals. Nevertheless, many contracts are
structured in a similar manner-perhaps because these arrangements
prove effective for defining and aligning an outsourcing relationship,
al., Outsourcing Software Development: A Contract Theoretic Analysis (Univ. of Wash., 15th
Annual Workshop on Info. Techs. & Sys. (WITS), 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=883114 (modeling agency problems in software outsourcing contracts under
a fixed price or time and materials arrangement).
127 See, e.g., Peter Brown, Crisis Management in Outsourcing Deals, 859 PLI/Pat 169
(2006); John F. Delaney, Outsourcing Transactions: Strategies for Success, 844 PLI/Pat 85
(2005); Rebecca S. Eisner, Wake Up and Smell the Privacy Issues: Recognizing and Manag-
ing Privacy Issues in Outsourcing (Including Offshore), 866 PLI/Pat 95 (2006); Karen K.
Harris, Issues for Healthcare Companies When Contracting with ASPs, 19 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 569 (2001).
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and perhaps because the lawyers drafting the deals rely on the prece-
dent of contractual boilerplate.' 28 In any case, as with other financial
contracts,1 29 it is possible to study a basic structure common to most
outsourcing transactions and to draw upon representative deals to
illustrate interesting terms.3 0 Furthermore, some firms have pursued
notable steps to mitigate agency risk, and these efforts are worth ana-
lyzing in some detail-even if they differ somewhat from a typical out-
sourcing contract.
More specifically, I will consider five major strategies that firms
take to mitigate the agency costs of outsourcing: (1) staged commit-
ment through an interlocking, multi-contractual framework; (2) the
use of redundant agents or the retention of duplicate activity within
the firm; (3) incentive compatible compensation; (4) explicit moni-
128 For a recent discussion of the benefits and concerns presented by contractual
boilerplate, see "Boilerplate": Foundations of Market Contracts Symposium, 104 MICH. L.
REv. 821 (2006).
129 For analogous work in other business contexts, see, for example, Stephen J.
Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Examination of
Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929, 931 (2004) (analyzing sovereign bond contracts);
Kahan & Yermack, supra note 17, at 138-48 (analyzing bond indentures); Steven N.
Kaplan & Per Stromberg, Characteristics, Contracts, and Actions: Evidence From Venture
Capitalist Analyses, 59J. FIN. 2177, 2208 (2004) (analyzing venture capital contracts);
Klausner & Litvak, supra note 106, at 56-58 (same); D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Struc-
ture of Strategic Alliances, 2005 U. ILL. L. Ruv. 303, 313-16 (2005) [hereinafter Smith,
Strategic Alliances] (analyzing business alliances); D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of
Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. Rxv. 315, 337-55 (2005) [hereinafter Smith, Venture Capi-
tal] (analyzing venture capital contracts).
130 Most of the analysis in this Part is based on a review of contracts released in
public SEC filings. Specifically, I reviewed 830 contracts for services, collected by an
online aggregator of SEC contracts (ONECLE). From this large collection of service
contracts, approximately eighty-nine documents involved outsourcing projects
(including amendments and supplemental work orders), and this subset of agree-
ments was analyzed in more detail. These contracts date from 1996 to 2006 and are
available at http://contracts.onecle.com/type/4.shtml. I believe that this collection
of business outsourcing contracts offers a meaningful basis for qualitative analysis of
the typical efforts taken to deal with the agency cost problem. I have also supple-
mented this analysis with other research to illustrate some specific risk mitigation
strategies. I have resisted, however, the urge to draw quantitative conclusions from
this sample (such as the percentage of firms employing various risk mitigation tech-
niques) due to potential selection biases. In particular, SEC disclosure requirements
in this area are not clear, and I believe that some firms seek to keep their outsourcing
transactions secret because they fear that public announcement might lead to inter-
nal morale problems, customer revolt, or political pressures. Furthermore, the fact
that these agreements span multiple contracts is problematic. See infra notes 131-41
and accompanying text. Parties will often disclose only a few of the interlocking con-
tracts, and it is difficult to know when the complete transactional framework is
compiled.
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toring and control rights; and (5) "for cause" and "for convenience"
exit rights.
1. Staged Contractual Commitment
Outsourcing projects are typically structured as a complicated
array of overlapping contracts. In part, this may be because it is costly
to negotiate and draft detailed contract terms. 13' Outsourcing rela-
tionships are known to take frequent twists and turns, and this uncer-
tain path progression makes it difficult to spell out the entire scope of
commitment up front. Parties may be better off waiting until impor-
tant contingencies play out before fully documenting their
relationship.
There is a second reason, however, why an outsourcing firm may
wish to proceed in this manner. Multiple, asynchronous contracts
allow firms to stage their commitment, freeing them to reduce the
scope of a project if hints of vendor opportunism arise. In this way,
the use of sequential commitment parallels a technique used by ven-
ture capital firms to mitigate agency risk by staging their investment in
target companies.' 32 Just as a VC investor commits slowly via multiple
funding rounds-each round contingent upon the achievement of
business milestones' 3 3-an outsourcing firm can stage its contractual
commitment by delaying detailed specification of scope and perform-
ance requirements. To understand how this staged commitment
works, consider the interactions between the four primary contracts
used in an outsourcing project: the confidentiality agreement, the
master agreement, the statements of work, and the service level
agreement.
First, during the initial negotiations, the parties will often sign a
confidentiality agreement to protect business information of both cli-
ent and vendor. This is typically structured as a stand-alone contract,
131 See Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX.
L. REv. 1581 (2005) (describing the costs involved in contract drafting and interpreta-
tion); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 60, at 594-95 (discussing how all contracts are
incomplete because it is costly to specify every potential contingency). I have con-
tended elsewhere that parties may also draft vague or incomplete contracts for other
reasons. See George S. Geis, An Embedded Options Theory of Indefinite Contracts, 90
MINN. L. REV. 1664, 1669 (2006) (arguing that a vague term may confer an embedded
option to either party).
132 See Bartlett, supra note 99, at 52-53; Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture
Capital Market: Lessons From the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1078-81
(2003); Klausner & Litvak, supra note 106, at 59.
133 Gilson, supra note 132, at 1073.
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signed in advance of the other deal documents,13 4 These confidenti-
ality agreements do not differ significantly from those used in other
business transactions, and I will not discuss them in detail. 13 5
The second deal document is called the master agreement, some-
times referred to as the framework agreement. This contract provides
an overview of the anticipated relationship and describes the business
goals in fairly broad strokes. Typically, it will also set a timeline for
moving the project forward and provide a governance structure-
including a schedule for joint meetings between high-level and opera-
tional-level personnel. It may also include other important terms,
such as a mechanism for resolving disputes and termination rights
and obligations. But while the master agreement can be quite
lengthy, it is usually silent on the exact work to be performed.13 6
A third collection of contracts, the statements of work, is subse-
quently negotiated to flesh out the project details. These documents
are numerous and often fairly short-sometimes just a few pages-
and they will include detailed work orders and project functionality
requests. 13 7 The usual procedure is to have mid-level managers from
both parties, those closer to the nuts and bolts of the project, draft the
statements of work in accordance with the general guidelines and
timeline set by the master agreement. And because the scope of an
134 Confidentiality agreements are often signed first because it takes a long time to
write an outsourcing contract-and because the very process of negotiating the deal
will often reveal sensitive information. Furthermore, the outsourcing firm may be
bargaining simultaneously with several vendors, and everyone will want proprietary
information protected even if the deal falls through. Sometimes, however, confidenti-
ality provisions are (unwisely) bundled into the master outsourcing agreement and
are not legally effective until the parties execute this contract.
135 The only obvious thing to note is that a confidentiality agreement protects
against the risk of an agent expropriating enumerated proprietary information as a
form of self-dealing. For further discussion of confidentially agreements, primarily in
the employment context, see Carol M. Bast, At What Price Silence: Are Confidentiality
Agreements Enforceable, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 627, 633-61 (1999).
136 See, e.g., Rosemary L. Gullikson, Statement of Work-The Road-Map of Services
Delivery, 880 PLI/Pat 173, 177 (2006); William A Tanenbaum, Revisiting Key Provisions
in Software and Outsourcing Agreements, J. INTERNET L., Mar. 2003, at 1.
137 Id. A nice example of the connection between the master agreement and
statement of work is found in a project where the John Wayne Cancer Institute out-
sourced data processing for clinical drug trials of a melanoma vaccine to a company
named Synteract. See Master Services Agreement Between CancerVax, The John
Wayne Cancer Institute, & Synteract, Inc., Jan. 22, 2002, available at http://contracts
.onecle.com/cancervax/wayne.svc.2002.01.22.shtml. The master agreement provides
a high level framework for the relationship, while a subsequent work order describes
the work to be performed: data input, quality control, database creation, adverse
event notification, statistical analysis, and other specific services. Id.
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outsourcing project may change frequently over time, it is also com-
mon to have many amendments and modifications to the statements
of work.
Finally, a fourth contract, the service level agreement (SLA), is
usually signed to govern the ongoing quality of project execution. 13 8
The SLA provides concrete performance metrics for the outsourcing
vendor to maintain during the life of the contract. It is usually quite
detailed; many SLAs run hundreds of pages. 139 Thus, while the state-
ments of work govern what will be done, the SLA governs how well the
work will be performed. 140 Like the statements of work, the SLA may
be amended as the scope of the project evolves. 141
It may be easier to see how these four outsourcing contracts fit
together with a short example. In 1999, the energy giant BP Amoco
decided to outsource much of its human resources management ser-
vices to a firm called Exult, 142 and the SEC filings surrounding this
transaction contain a particularly large amount of information.' 43
138 Like the other deal documents, the SLA is sometimes bundled with the master
agreement. But over time, as the project's scope changes with the statements of work,
SLAs will typically evolve to support these changes.
139 E.g., Amended and Restated Global Master Services Agreement Between Coors
Brewing Company & EDS Information Services, L.L.C.,Jan. 1, 2004, available at http:/
/contracts.onecle.com/coors/eds.svc.2004.01.01 .shtml (hereinafter Coors / EDS
Contract] (running approximately 28,000 words).
140 For example, an agreement to outsource the storage and management of
Internet networking equipment (a "hosting" contract) may have statements of work
describing the type of servers and the space that will be allotted to the client. See
Robert D. Austin, Web and IT Hosting Facilities, Harvard Business School Technology
Note 9-601-134, at 7-8 (2003). It is the SLA, however, that typically guarantees spe-
cific perfornance measures, such as packet transmission rates, bit-loss frequency,
response times for service calls, and so on. Id.
141 Similarly, the parties may plan to renegotiate service levels over time. For
instance, the contract between EDS and Coors Brewing Co. provides that "[alt the
following intervals the Parties shall jointly review all then-applicable Service Levels...
and adjust them to reflect any improved performance capabilities associated with
advances in the technology and methods used to perform the Services." Coors/EDS
Contract, supra note 139, § 4.2(a).
142 For an excellent overview of human resources outsourcing and further back-
ground on the BP Amoco deal, see generally Paul S. Adler, Outsourcing: A Frame-
work and the Case of Human Resource Management (Oct. 2, 2002) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract317502. Exult was subsequently
acquired by Hewitt Associates in 2004. Hewitt Associates to Acquire Exult A Rival, N.Y.
TIMES, June 17, 2004, at C4.
143 See Framework Agreement Between BP Amoco P.L.C. & Exult, Inc., Dec. 7,
1999, available at http://contracts.onecle.com/exult/bpamoco.svc.1999.12.07.shtml
[hereinafter BP Amoco / Exult Framework Agreement]. Very similar master service
agreements were also executed on the same day between Exult and subsidiaries of BP
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The master agreement provides a general description 
of the project,
which includes ambitious, though nebulous, 
goals such as
"[a]utomation of relevant transactional processes and 
employee
access through the implementation of web-enabled 
human resources
support," "[c]onsolidation and integration of human resources 
trans-
actional processing support into Client Service 
Centres," and
"[r]ationalisation and integration of third party 
service providers."
1 44
The master agreement also sets out a timetable 
for Exult to submit
detailed plans to provide this human resources 
support and for both
parties to conduct due diligence of these plans.'
45 It then goes into
great detail on how Exult will be paid, how the 
project will be gov-
erned, how disputes will be resolved, which employees 
will be trans-
ferred to Exult, and other general 
terms.146
But the master agreement is exceptionally vague 
on the exact
activities that Exult will perform for BP Amoco. 
One appendix rattles
off about twenty different services-things like training, 
HR strategy,
labor relations, managing employee records, payroll, 
recruiting, sever-
ance, and so on-and provides a two or three paragraph 
description
of how each activity will be divided between 
Exult and BP Amoco.
147
These descriptions are remarkably ambiguous,
148 and the true scope
of the project will only come to light when the detailed statements 
of
Amoco in the United States and the United Kingdom. 
See US Country Agreement
Between BP America, Inc. & Exult Inc., Dec. 7, 
1999, available at http://contracts.
onecle.com/exult/bpamerica.svc.19
9 9
.
12
.07.shtmi; UK Country Agreement Between
BP International, Ltd. & Exult, Ltd., Dec. 7, 1999, 
available at http://contracts.onecle.
com/exult/bpintl.svc. 1999.12.07.shtml.
144 BP Amoco / Exult Framework Agreement, 
supra note 143, preamble.
145 Id. §§ 2, 4.
146 Id. §§ 2, 8, 9, 16, 25, 28. The master agreement also 
contains confidentiality
provisions. Id. § 14. I do not know whether the parties signed 
a separate confidenti-
ality agreement before negotiating this master agreement.
147 Id. at 63 sched. A.
148 For example, under the heading for the first 
service, training, the agreement
runs as follows:
Training as a process includes training needs assessment, 
course/materials
development, logistics co-ordination, conduct 
of training and training
leader selection, training effectiveness assessment 
and post training follow-
up. Delivery of training materials includes traditional classroom, 
self-study,
computer-aided training and third party training 
delivery mechanisms.
[BP Amoco] shall develop training strategies and policies, 
develop and
deliver training programs based on needs analyses 
and assess the cost/bene-
fit of training programs. Exult shall administer course 
schedules, registra-
tion, confirmations and training materials. Exult 
shall also administer
attendee evaluations of training programs and 
tuition reimbursement.
Id. at 64-65.
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work and the SLAs are subsequently negotiated by project managers
at BP Amoco and Exult.
It is this delay between high-level master agreements and actiona-
ble statements of work that allows an outsourcing firm to stage its
commitment-and thereby mitigate the risk of vendor opportunism.
The master agreement may set out the contemplated scope of a pro-
ject, but the devil is always in the details. A principal detecting any
sign of poor performance, or losing trust in the vendor, will usually
have ample leeway to scale back commitment as additional statements
of work are drafted.
In addition, the parties will sometimes use more direct contrac-
tual methods to stage their commitment. For instance, many out-
sourcing contracts have a limited life, typically five to ten years.1 49
This provides another check on vendor opportunism: an imminent
renewal decision by the principal may keep some agents from misbe-
having. 50 Other outsourcing projects use contracts that are limited
in geographic scope but dangle the possibility of future expansion. In
its deal with Exult, for example, BP Amoco agrees to initially out-
source human resource services only in the United States and the
United Kingdom. t 51 But it also sets up procedures for expanding the
project to other countries at a later time. 152 These types of provisions
are explicit mechanisms for reducing agency risk through staged
commitment.
There is one obvious problem, however, with using a staged com-
mitment strategy to mitigate agency risk: It may be hard for the princi-
pal to detect poor performance. The hallmark of agency costs, after
all, is asymmetric information,' 5 and it can be difficult to determine
whether an agent is doing anything wrong. Even when there are obvi-
ous signs of poor performance, the agent vendor may blame the
problems on external market conditions. Thus, there must be some
way to measure, at the back end of a period, whether to move on to
the next stage of commitment.
149 For an example of this, see infra note 187 (describing a contract with an antici-
pated seven-year term).
150 On this note, IBM, one the of largest technology outsourcing vendors, has
recently announced that "smaller and shorter contracts are more profitable and pre-
ferred by customers." Charles Forelle, IBM Turns to Smaller Service Deals, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 24, 2005, at A3. If so, one possible explanation for the greater profitability of
shorter contracts is that they create less costly agency problems-thereby decreasing
the need for IBM to discount prices for this risk.
151 BP Amoco / Exult Framework Agreement, supra note 143, § 2.
152 Id.
153 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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Venture capitalists typically address this problem by placing per-
formance expectations on future funding. 15 4 In an outsourcing pro-
ject, the service level agreement can act in a similar manner. As
mentioned, the parties will typically take great efforts to define the
exact scope of duties in the work statements and to spell out metrics
for acceptable performance in the SLA. If SLA performance mea-
sures fall short of expectations, then the principal will have a basis for
abandoning the next stage of an outsourcing project. 55
Nevertheless, it can be challenging to set the right benchmarks in
the first place. And even with detailed performance metrics, it may be
hard for a principal to detect all forms of agent self-dealing. To
counter these concerns, outsourcing principals might turn to other
strategies, such as the employment of multiple agents or co-sourcing.
2. Multiple Agents and Co-Sourcing
A second way to manage agency risk involves the use of multiple
agents and co-sourcing-that is, keeping some of the outsourced
activity within the firm. 56 By dividing a project into pieces and award-
ing each piece to different agents, principals can, in theory, introduce
an element of competition that will help them monitor the agents'
performance. Further, the agents will often be aware of this scrutiny,
and this knowledge may also prevent some misbehavior.
For instance, a firm outsourcing the hosting and management of
its networking infrastructure might divide the company in half and
award part of the project to one vendor and the rest to another. This
tactic gives the principal an automatic way to benchmark the perform-
ance of both agents: it can directly compare packet transmission rates,
bit-loss frequency, service call response rates, and the other relevant
metrics.15 7 This might help the principal identify hidden risks or
uncover agency distortions.
Consider the approach taken by one of India's largest mobile
phone companies, a firm named Bharti Airtel. As part of a fascinating
transition over the past few years, Bharti has outsourced nearly all of
its business activities-including technology infrastructure, IT ser-
154 See Bartlett, supra note 99, at 64-80; Klausner & Litvak, supra note 106. These
financial benchmarks may need to be adjusted with common sense, however, or they
will prove over- and under-inclusive.
155 Further, failure to meet SLA performance requirements may trigger financial
penalties or "for-cause" exit rights. See infra Part Il.A.5.
156 See Aklin et al., supra note 126, at 2 (defining co-sourcing).
157 For an explanation of these metrics, see Austin, supra note 140, at 3-4.
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vices, billing, provisioning, and so on-to other firms. 158 Recently, it
also decided to outsource its customer service centers, following this
strategy of multiple agents. After dividing operations into four
regions, Bharti hired a different vendor to handle the inbound service
calls of customers in each region. 159 This strategy gives Bharti a basis
for comparing the efficiency of each vendor. In some cases, Bharti
also assigned two vendors to a geographic region-to counter the
potential excuse that an agent's poor performance should be blamed
on market conditions.1 60
Related to this strategy of using multiple agents, a principal will
sometimes benchmark performance by co-sourcing a project. 161
Under this approach, the principal simply outsources part of the
work, keeping a share of the activity within the firm. Co-sourcing also
allows the principal to pace the performance of agents, and it may
have added strategic benefits. 62
Continuing with the previous example, Bharti supplemented its
call center outsourcing strategy by keeping an in-house division to
perform the same work. 163 It uses the company-owned call center to
manage particularly important customers by performing an initial
screen on all incoming calls. High-value customers are routed to the
in-house service center, while all other customers are automatically
transferred to one of the four outsourcing vendors.164 This strategy
allows Bharti to retain control of the high-end customer experience,
and it also provides a reliable, internal benchmark on the perform-
ance of call-center agents. 16 5
Unfortunately, the use of multiple agents or co-sourcing comes
with a price. A firm may lose economies of scale by splitting an out-
158 Bharti's strategy is particularly interesting, because many of its deals have
involved "reverse offshore outsourcing," the movement of business activity from an
Indian principal to agents in the United States. See Rebecca Buckman, Outsourcing
with a Twist: Indian Phone Giant Bharti Sends Jobs to Western Firns in a Multinational Role
Switch, WALL ST.J., Jan. 18, 2005, at Al; Ray Marcelo & Paul Taylor, IBM Turns Tables
on Indian Outsourcing, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2004, at 1.
159 See Balaka Baruah Aggarwal, Bharti's Outsourcing Innovation, DAT'AQuEST, Sep.
27, 2005, http://www.dqindia.com/content/industrymarket/2005/105092702.asp.
160 Id.
161 See Akin et al., supra note 126, at 2.
162 See, e.g., Noshir F. Kaka, Running a Customer Service Center in India: An Interview
With the Head of Operations for Dell India, MCGKNSE' Q., May 2006, http://www.mckin-
seyquarterly.com/article-abstract.aspx?ar=1779&L2=13&L3-13 (discussing Dell Com-
puter's co-sourcing strategy).
163 See Aggarwal, supra note 159.
164 Id.
165 Id.
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sourcing project into several smaller chunks. Often, outsourcing ven-
dors can bargain for higher fees when the size of the contract is
smaller.' 66 In addition, the principal will need to incur extra transac-
tion costs to stitch together the outsourcing project. Instead of deal-
ing with just one big partner, it will need to manage a collection of
smaller relationships and divide project responsibilities among the
vendors. Thus, like all other monitoring investments, there is a funda-
mental tension in the use of this strategy: adding more vendors
increases competitive pressure and mitigates agency risk, but it also
raises transaction and coordination costs. Furthermore, it may be
impossible to break up some outsourcing projects into meaningful
pieces. Some assignments may not have parallel processes-or may
not be divisible and measurable in a sensible way.
Nevertheless, under the right circumstances, it may be worth
trading additional monitoring costs for reduced agency distortions.
And if it is indeed becoming cheaper to coordinate activity between
multiple vendors-as I will soon argue 167 -then we might expect to
see more outsourcing principals using these structures.
3. Incentive Compatible Compensation
A third strategy for mitigating outsourcing agency risk is to set a
compensation scheme that seeks to align vendors' economic interests
with those of the principal. Just as a corporation issues options to top
managers to focus their efforts on boosting stock prices,168 an out-
sourcing principal might negotiate incentive compatible compensa-
tion structures to narrow the agency gap. While these tactics may help
at the margins-and are thus worth understanding-it is important to
note that they will never fully solve the agency problem. Anything
short of transferring a complete ownership interest to the agent will
leave room for economic distortions. 169
Before turning to a few of these compensation strategies, let me
quickly point out the problems with standard ways of paying for out-
sourcing services. Consider two extreme compensation paradigms: a
time and materials contract, and a fixed price contract.170 Time and
166 See Forelle, supra note 150.
167 See infra Part 1I1.B.
168 SeeJensen & Meckling, supra note 12, at 312-13; Jensen & Murphy, supra note
14, at 232-35.
169 See Sitkoff, supra note 97, at 637.
170 For additional discussion of the agency problems presented by time and mater-
ials and fixed price contracts, see Alexander j. Triantis & George G. Triantis, Timing
Problems in Contract Breach Decisions, 41 J.L. & ECON. 163, 187-93 (more formally
exploring agency costs in a fixed price contract).
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materials compensation, where the agent simply adds a markup to the
project's input costs, presents obvious agency problems. The vendor
has no incentive to tackle a project in a cost-effective manner because
she will be paid for shirking or other inefficient behavior. 171 A fixed
price contract, by contrast, transfers the pain of excessive input costs
to the vendor. But this paradigm raises other incentives to perform
shoddy work; the vendor might, for example, take excessive risks and
still get paid in full. Sometimes, an outsourcing principal will try a
compromise approach-by imposing a time and materials contract
with a maximum price cap-but this strategy just presents the con-
cerns of both payment schemes. 172
In place of these standard pricing strategies, some outsourcing
contracts are substituting incentive compatible compensation terms.
For example, they might award half of all cost savings below a specific
target to agent vendors or impose other "earn-out" requirements. 173
Other contracts require annual negotiation of compensation (a strat-
egy similar to staged commitment) or impose fines if service levels
miss contractual requirements. In the outsourcing contract between
BP Amoco and Exult,1 74 for example, a project manager at Exult
admitted that "[w]e are obligated to certain performance levels ...
and we'd have to pay big penalties if we missed those levels." 175 Still
other contracts will pay vendors with the principal's stock to directly
align agent incentives. Many other compensation schemes might
serve similar purposes; the key is simply to focus the attention of both
parties on the same goals. But at the end of the day, these strategies
171 Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the Prob-
lem of Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 135, 203-04
(2005) (discussing both types of arrangements in government contracting).
172 For example, a contract using this hybrid fee arrangement might pay the ven-
dor a twenty percent markup on all time and material expenses-but limit the annual
payments to one million dollars at a maximum. Such an arrangement might
encourage the vendor to engage in excessive activity early in the year and to slash
activity later on (perhaps via excessive risk) as it approaches the one million dollar
cap. Neither incentives are in the principal's best interest. Similarly, the Bharti Airtel
deal, described supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text, pays call center vendors
on a per call basis, rather than on a per employee basis. Aggarwal, supra note 159.
This structure encourages vendors to focus on operating efficiency-rather than just
scaling up employees-but it may also reduce the quality of service by imposing more
time pressure on each call.
173 See David Craig & Paul Willmott, Outsourcing Grows Up, MCKINSEY Q., Feb. 2006,
http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/article abstract.aspx?ar-- 1582.
174 See supra notes 142-52 and accompanying text.
175 Adler, supra note 142 (manuscript at 20).
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will never eliminate agency risk completely-they can only influence
vendor behavior at the margins.
4. Explicit Monitoring and Control Rights
Perhaps the most direct way to mitigate the agency costs of busi-
ness outsourcing is to write contracts with explicit monitoring or con-
trol rights. Many transactions require vendors to participate in
extensive business audits that allow principals-or their designated
third parties-to come on site and inspect financial records and oper-
ating procedures. 176 In theory, these monitoring provisions should
reduce an agent's temptation to make self-interested decisions
because the principal will have a better chance at uncovering the bad
behavior. 177
Explicit control rights work in a similar, but ex ante, manner by
giving principals power over decisions that are typically delegated to
the agent. The scope of these rights will differ from transaction to
transaction, but a major outsourcing client may hold sway over impor-
tant decisions such as employee hiring and training, equipment
upgrades, managerial ratios, the selection of subcontractors, and
other operating activities. 178 Sometimes this control comes through
contractual carve-outs allowing principals to veto particularly impor-
tant decisions rather than make direct decisions.179
The principal might also seek to exert control at a higher level by
taking an ownership interest in the agent. For example, in the BP
Amoco-Exult deal, BP bought eight percent of Exult's stock as a "sign
of good faith.""' Minority equity ownership will not give a principal
explicit control of the agent, but it may allow the principal to exert
176 E.g., Master Services Agreement Between Exult, Inc. & Bank of America Corp.,
Nov. 21, 2000, § 17, available at http://contracts.onece.com/exult/bofa.svc.2000.11
.21.shtml.
177 See Arrow, supra note 86, at 45-46; Fama, supra note 86, at 293; Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 12, at 323-25.
178 E.g., Master Agreement for Outsourcing Call Center Support Between Price-
line.com LLC and Calltech Communication Inc., §§ 1, 3, 1998, available at http://
contracts.onecle.com/priceline/calltech.svc.1998.shtml [hereinafter Priceline.com /
Calltech Agreement] (dictating hours of operation, training requirements, and other
operating procedures). Contracts providing extensive principal control, sometimes
termed "virtual captive offshoring" arrangements, are discussed infra notes 212-18
and accompanying text.
179 Similar veto provisions are often used in debt contracts. See Amihud et al.,
supra note 17, at 464-65; Fischel, supra note 17, at 145.
180 Adler, supra note 142 (manuscript at 16). The quote is curiously ambiguous
on whether BP is demonstrating "good faith" to Exult or purchasing it from the
vendor.
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considerable influence.18 1 This type of control is similar to that
enjoyed by a venture capital investor-although VC firms will often
use preferred stock and other methods to exert influence even
beyond their proportional ownership in a firm. 8 2 Such extensive
control rights are much rarer in the business outsourcing context.
5. Exit Rights
The last strategy for managing agency costs that I will discuss
involves exit rights, the legal power to terminate an outsourcing con-
tract before the contemplated term expires. Exit rights raise an inter-
esting tension-as they do in other corporate contexts' 3-because of
two competing concerns. On the one hand, allowing an outsourcing
principal to exit at will provides a check on vendor opportunism.8 4 If
the principal detects poor quality work, excessive costs, or any other
problem, it can simply end the deal. In this sense, liberal exit rights
serve as the ultimate check on agency cost problems, and even the
threat of early termination may keep vendors in line.'8 5
But, on the other hand, an outsourcing vendor will often need to
incur relation-specific investments to take on new work, and it may
worry about writing an open-ended put option on the project.18 6 For
example, IBM, one of the world's largest technology outsourcing ven-
dors, recently experienced a devastating loss when JP Morgan Chase
cancelled a five billion dollar outsourcing project just eighteen
181 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MIcH. L. REV.
520, 524, 585-89 (1990); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Signficance of Insti-
tutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 473-74 (1991); see also MARK ROE,
STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS 169-86 (1994) (discussing governance practices in
countries with a preponderance of equity blockholding).
182 For example, venture capital investors might seek dedicated board seats or
greater voting power than other shareholders. See Bartlett, supra note 99, at 53-54.
183 The right to exit an economic relationship-and the flip side of exit rights, the
power to "lock in" capital-has been discussed extensively in the legal literature. See,
e.g., Blair, supra note 64, at 441-55 (corporations); Larry E. Ribstein, A Statutory
Approach to Partner Dissociation, 65 WAsti. U. L.Q. 357, 389-92 (1987) (partnerships);
Smith, Strategic Alliances, supra note 129, at 311-12 (business alliances); Smith, Venture
Capital, supra note 129, at 337-56 (venture capital finance).
184 See Smith, Strategic Alliances, supra note 129, at 311.
185 See id.
186 For those less fluent in options terminology, a put option is the right-but not
the obligation-to sell something at a given price. See RicHARD A. BREALFm, STEwART
C. MYERS, & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 544 (8th ed. 2006);
JOHN C. HULL, FUNDAMENTALS OF FUTURES AND OPTIONS MARKETS 263-81 (5th ed.
2005). Thus, granting unrestricted termination rights to an outsourcing firm essen-
tially gives them a put on the project.
[VOL. 82:3
20071 BUSINESS OUTSOURCING AND 
THE AGENCY COST PROBLEM 995
months into a seven year contract.'
87 Easy exit rights thus raise
another potential problem: outsourcing principals 
might use, or
threaten to use, these exit rights opportunistically 
to extort a better
deal.1 88
Because of these competing tensions, exit rights 
are often one of
the most heavily negotiated provisions in an outsourcing 
contract.
Parties typically take great pains to define when and 
how a firm may
walk away from the project-and to set the financial consequences 
of
an early exit. The typical compromise involves dual 
exit rights: termi-
nation for cause and termination for convenience.
1 89 Under the "for
cause" track, a principal is entitled to exit the relationship 
if the agent
does not live up to service level requirements or 
if other problems
arise. 190 Under the "for convenience" track, a principal 
is entitled to
cancel the project without proof of bad service, but it may need 
to
reimburse the agent for upfront asset purchases or 
pay other financial
penalties.' 91 Under both tracks, the agent is usually 
required to sup-
187 JP Morgan Chase was free to do so under the 
contract because IBM was pursu-
ing a new services "on demand" strategy, under 
which it hoped to turn information
technology into a utility like gas or electricity using 
pay-as-you-go arrangements. JP
Morgan Chase signed up for the service in 2002 
as a marquee client for IBM. See
Daniel Golden, IBM Gets JP. Morgan Outsourcing 
Pact, WALL. ST. J., Jan. 15, 2004, at
AIO (quoting a top IBM executive that theJP Morgan deal was 
"by far the largest and
most comprehensive on-demand deal we've signed" 
and quoting a Goldman Sachs
analyst that the contract was "very high-profile" 
and a key "reference account" for
evaluating the on-demand approach). Under the agreement, 
IBM would manage
most of the bank's core technology functions, including 
data centers, help desks, data
and voice networks, and distributed computing. 
Forelle, supra note 108. The deal
was structured, however, so thatJP Morgan could 
halt the outsourcing project at any
time-although the contract was contemplated to 
last for at least seven years. IBM
incurred large upfront investments to supportJP 
Morgan's technology needs, and the
partnership moved forward, But when Jamie Dimon 
took over the leadership of JP
Morgan, his team soon decided to pull the plug on 
the IBM project-pointing to the
high cost of the contract, the strategic importance 
of IT ownership, and to excess
technology capacity at BankOne. Id. More recently, 
IBM has deemphasized its "on-
demand" strategy and has been pushing shorter 
projects that shift termination risk
back to clients. See supra note 150.
188 See Smith, Strategic Alliances, supra note 129, 
at 311.
189 Id. at 346-50.
190 Id. at 304.
191 Without financial penalty, liberal exit rights 
of this sort might raise mutuality
of obligation concerns in contract law-although 
a good faith requirement would
most likely be read into the exit terms to skirt 
the problem. See E. ALLAN FARNS-
woRTH, CONTRACTS §§ 2.13, 3.2 (4th ed. 2004);JOHN EDwARD MURRAY, 
JR., MURRAY ON
CONTRACTS 249-50 (4th ed. 2001); JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI 
D PERILLO ON
CONTRACTS § 4.12 (5th ed. 2003). 1 am unaware of any situation 
where a party has
attacked the validity of an outsourcing contract along 
these lines.
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port transition to another vendor, although the 
obligations may differ
between the two types of exit.
An outsourcing partnership between Priceline.com, 
the online
travel firm, and Calltech, a call center vendor, 
provides a nice exam-
ple of a typical exit arrangement. In 1998, 
Priceline decided to out-
source all of its inbound call center work 
to Calltech. 19 2 The deal
would last for a year with automatic annual 
renewal unless notice was
provided prior to the end of a term.
193 Priceline then secured "for
cause" termination rights, allowing it to 
cancel the agreement if
Calltech failed to meet performance obligations-as 
defined in the
statements of work and the SLA-or if 
Calltech suffered financial
problems.19 4 Priceline also negotiated "for 
convenience" exit rights,
allowing termination with just ninety days notice. But if 
Priceline trig-
gered these rights, it would incur an early 
termination fee designed to
"compensate CALLTECH for all costs and expenses actually and rea-
sonably incurred by CALLTECH for personnel 
and equipment
engaged in providing Services to PRICELINE .... 
-195 The agreement
goes on, however, to require Calltech to 
make good faith efforts to
discharge this fee by redeploying these assets-and, 
interestingly, that
the termination fee will be capped at the total 
bill charged by Calltech
during the month prior to termination.
1 96 The exit structure of this
deal thus stages a complicated dance to 
mitigate dual opportunism:
Priceline can threaten to leave if it thinks Calltech 
is behaving badly,
but it must pay a termination fee to do so, 
but the termination fee is
limited by agent redeployment requirements.
Of course, the complexity of a large outsourcing 
project can
sometimes make it hard to determine 
whether termination is "for
cause" or "for convenience." A principal 
might unjustifiably claim
"for cause" termination in order to avoid 
the financial penalties of a
convenience exit. And conversely, an agent 
may refuse to accept evi
dence that bad behavior amounts to cause.'
9 7 Because language is
192 For general background on this deal, see 
Marcia Pledger, Netting New Business,
PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Feb. 17, 2000, at IC.
193 Priceline.com / Calltech Agreement, supra 
note 178, § 5.1 (between Price-
line.com LLC and Calltech Communication 
Inc.).
194 Id. § 5.2. The financial problems triggering for 
cause termination include
bankruptcy, liabilities in excess of assets, and other 
indicators of financial distress. Id.
195 Id. § 5.3.
196 Id. This clause illustrates, perhaps, Priceline's 
clout in negotiating the deal. It
is likely that the financial pain to Calltech from 
termination would exceed one month
in billings.
197 This problem surfaced recently in litigation 
between Sears and Computer Sci-
ences Corp. (CSC), a large outsourcing vendor. When 
Sears sought to cancel the
project for cause, CSC countered that the exit was really for 
convenience and that
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ambiguous and context-dependent, parties will never 
be able to set
upfront exit rights to govern every possible distortion.
198 And the
exact contours of these rights will differ according 
to the needs and
bargaining power of both parties. But the overall framework 
of dual
track termination does make economic sense when 
it is viewed as a
technique for mitigating agency risk.
In summary, then, firms have a large menu of strategies 
for moni-
toring the agency costs of outsourcing. They might 
draft detailed ser-
vice level requirements, stage contractual commitment, 
employ
redundant agents, secure broad control provisions, 
negotiate liberal
exit rights, or take other steps. What is to be made 
of these collected
techniques for detecting and preventing agency risk?
B. Falling Monitoring Costs as a Catalyst for Outsourcing
It is tempting to conclude that contractual efforts 
to mitigate out-
sourcing agency risk are nothing out of the ordinary. 
Parties will,
after all, usually take steps to protect their interests 
when forming an
important economic association. Many agency relationships-includ-
ing those of shareholder and manager, creditor 
and manager, man-
ager and employee, and promisee and promisor 
(of which
outsourcing is simply a variant)-use detailed contracts to define 
per-
formance obligations, allocate risks, set control 
rights, and divide
profits.
Furthermore, there is nothing novel about the 
specific con-
tracting devices used in an outsourcing transaction. 
Some of the strat-
egies, such as staged investment
99 or minority equity investment,
200
have been borrowed directly from the 
world of venture capital.
20 i
Sears was attempting to dodge large financial penalties. 
See Joseph R. Perone, Possible
Fort Closing and Lawsuit Dog Computer Sciences, STAR LEDGER 
(Newark, N.J.), May 23,
2005, at 24; Robert Weisman, Technology Outsourcing 
Comes Home, BOSTON GLOBE, May
29, 2005, at E3. Unusually, CSC also tried (unsuccessfully) 
to seal the appellate court
record of this lawsuit as a trade secret. See Carol Silwa, 
Sidebar: CSC Tried, Failed to Seal
Court Records on Appeal, COMPUTERWORLD, May 23, 
2005, http://www.comaputerworld
.com/action/article.do?command=ViewArticleBasic&articleld-101909&intsrc=Article
_potsbot.
198 See supra note 131. Another concern presented 
by the cause-convenience exit
framework is that a large for-convenience fee might 
give an agent incentives to per-
form poorly-although not so poorly that the principal 
can prove cause-in order to
induce the principal to terminate and pay the agent 
the convenience fee.
199 See supra Part III.A.I.
200 See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying 
text.
201 Bartlett, supra note 99, at 52-56; Gilson, supra 
note 132, at 1078; Klausner &
Litvak, supra note 106, at 59-69.
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Other techniques are common in long-term supply contracts, 202
employment agreements (including high-level executive compensa-
tion contracts203 ), bond indentures, 20 4 and other financing arrange-
ments. And while the interplay between a master outsourcing
agreement, a service level agreement, and the statements of work can
be quite elaborate, I want to resist the argument that these contracts
are uniquely complex.
But it is worth considering whether it has become easier for out-
sourcing parties to use these contractual techniques to mitigate
agency risk-and if so, whether this has served as an additional cata-
lyst for outsourcing. I would contend that the same forces opening
global markets are also making it easier and cheaper to monitor and
prevent the agency costs of outsourcing. Specifically, technology,
standardization of business processes, and plunging communication
costs are changing the cost-effectiveness of investments to monitor
agency risk.
I am not claiming that outsourcing trends are driven only by fall-
ing monitoring costs. Certainly a large part of the change has arisen
from a firm's desire to enjoy cheaper production. But there are really
two effects in play: a carrot and a stick. The conventional explanation
for the rise of business outsourcing focuses on the carrot-that is, on
the economic gains from moving business activity to cheaper market-
based production. 205 I am simply contending that the exact same
forces that have increased the size of the carrot are also increasing the
ease with which a principal can wield the stick to ward off agency
costs.
Consider, at least briefly, how macroeconomic forces are making
it easier for firms to employ contractual strategies that mitigate the
agency cost problem. First, cheaper communication costs and stan-
dardized business processes simplify the drafting of detailed work
descriptions and performance obligations. Obviously, it will cost less
to write a comprehensive (though still incomplete20 6) agreement
when expensive international phone calls and business trips are
replaced with distributed voice and video networks.
Second, the standardization of business processes allows parties
to pull performance criteria "off the rack" instead of haggling over the
right way to assess execution of the business activity. For example, the
202 See, e.g., Hviid, supra note 27, § 4200, at 47; Scott, supra note 27, at 2012-15.
203 BESCHUu & FRImE, supra note 13; Jensen & Murphy, supra note 14, at 227-42.
204 See Amihud et al., supra note 17, at 453-56; Fischel, supra note 17, at 135-37.
205 See supra notes 69-82 and accompanying text.
206 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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metrics to appraise performance in an internet 
hosting project are
now routinely defined to include packet transmission 
rates, bit-loss
frequency, response rates for service calls, and so 
on. 20 7 This makes it
easier to draft a service level agreement to govern 
this type of out-
sourcing project. Furthermore, in addition to economizing 
drafting
costs, standardized metrics simplify efforts to 
monitor compliance
with these SLAs once they are in place. Firms 
need not design cus-
tomized monitoring processes for every project. Of course, most 
busi-
ness processes are not fully commoditized-and 
even when they are, it
still costs something to monitor performance-but 
there are signs of
increasing standardization in many 
activities. 208
Third, cheaper communication, better technology, 
and standard-
ized business processes make it easier to design 
and coordinate multi-
ple agent structures or to leave part of an outsourced 
activity under
the principal's control. Bharti Airtel, for example, 
would find it more
difficult to divide India into four different service 
regions if technol-
ogy did not exist to identify a call's origin and 
quickly route it to the
optimal destination. 20
9 Similarly, plunging interaction costs make it
easier to chop a software project, a human resources support project,
or a drug discovery project into many different pieces, to 
give each
piece to a different agent, and to stitch the pieces 
together again on
the back end. As described earlier, this use of 
multiple agents allows
firms to reduce agency risk through 
competition and
benchmarking.
210
Finally, falling interaction costs help principals 
use incentive com-
patible compensation, control rights, and exit 
provisions more effec-
tively. For example, standardized metrics make 
it easier to choose the
key performance indicators that will align compensation 
with agent
incentives. To continue with the internet hosting 
example, fees will
often be adjusted when packet transmission rates or bit-loss 
frequen-
cies fall short of stated performance requirements. 
Similarly, princi-
pals will find it easier to draft and use "for-cause" 
termination clauses
when the relevant metrics can be taken off the 
shelf. And they will
find it easier to exercise control rights-and 
make thoughtful deci-
sions-as information transmission costs drop.
While there are plenty of qualitative empirical examples, 
I, unfor-
tunately, do not have quantitative evidence that 
these falling interac-
207 See Austin, supra note 140, at 3-4.
208 See Davenport, supra note 23, at 104. Standardization 
also helps to increase the
supply of a given activity-and thus drives down 
production costs-by facilitating the
entry of new vendors to perform the activity. 
Id. at 102.
209 This project is described supra notes 158-64 and accompanying 
text.
210 See supra Part 1II.A.2.
1000 .....
tion costs have led to a surge in monitoring activity. Such 
a study
would be fascinating, but I am not sure whether 
it is possible to gather
meaningful data-or indeed, even what the relevant 
metrics would
be. Furthermore, business outsourcing has only 
grown rapidly in the
past decade, and if falling monitoring costs are 
partly responsible for
this trend, we should expect most significant 
outsourcing contracts to
have extensive risk-mitigation provisions.
Yet I do not think that it is too controversial to 
suggest that inter-
action costs are falling
21
-or to argue that these changes will increase
the effectiveness of monitoring investments. If 
all this is indeed true,
then the conventional explanation for the rise 
of outsourcing-that
falling interaction costs are allowing firms to 
access inexpensive pro-
duction markets-may be only half of the story. 
Firms may be turning
to outsourcing not only to capture the gains 
of remote trade, but also
because they are finding it easier to contain 
the hazards of
outsourcing.
Consider, as a final illustration, a recent outsourcing 
project
launched by Wachovia, a large US bank long 
known for its aversion to
offshoring and business outsourcing.
212 Under competitive pressure,
and tempted by an intriguing new structure, 
Wachovia eventually
decided to move some operations overseas. 
Unlike many financial
institutions, however, Wachovia did not wish to 
start a captive offshore
facility-one remaining within its corporate 
borders-because the
bank felt that it was too expensive to manage 
a division on the other
side of the world.M3 Furthermore, Wachovia 
thought it would be too
difficult to attract the best talent because 
it had no reputation
overseas.
214
211 Cf Yochi Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature 
of the Firm, 112
YALE L.J. 369 (2002) (discussing factors underlying collaborative 
models of produc-
tion); Frank H. Easterbrook, Contract and Copyright, 42 
Hous. L. REv. 953, 966-67
(2005) ("Technology is moving us toward the world where 
transaction costs are close
to zero .... "); Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New 
Vote Buying: Empty Voting and
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 844-45 
(2006) ("[C]ontinued
improvements in financial technology are 
likely to drive down transaction costs.");
Lynn A. Stout, Technology, Transactions Costs, and 
Investor Welfare: Is a Motley Fool Born
Every Minute?, 75 WAsm. U. L.Q. 791, 806-12 (1997) (discussing 
the link between tech-
nology and falling transactions costs in securities 
regulation).
212 For example, Ken Thomson, CEO of 
Wachovia, has said "There is nothing I
would rather do than turn back the clock and 
say, 'We will not offshore,' but we don't
have that luxury." Dean Foust, Wachovia's Change of Heart, Bus. WK. 
ONLINE, Jan. 30,
2006, http://www.businessweek cor/magazine/content/06-05/b3969422.htm.
213 Id.
214 Id.
[VOL. 82:3O-TRF D AME LAW REVIEW
2007] BUSINESS OUTSOURCING AND THE AGENCY COST PROBLEM 1001
Instead, Wachovia signed an outsourcing contract with Genpact,
a large Indian vendor who had recently been spun off from General
Electric. Genpact took over a wide variety of business processes for
Wachovia, 215 although the exact details of the contract have been kept
confidential. 216 It is understood, however, that the deal is structured
to provide Wachovia with a "virtual captive" unit-one where it can
retain tremendous control over the hiring and firing of employees
and other key decisions.2 1 7 The goal is to retain the control of a cap-
tive unit while also realizing greater cost savings and flexibility from
outsourcing.218 Exercising these control rights will certainly prove
more expensive for Wachovia than leaving everything to Genpact's
discretion. But, then again, falling interaction costs may make it eas-
ier for Wachovia to make important decisions from afar, thereby nar-
rowing agency cost risk. It is interesting to ask whether Wachovia
would have even undertaken this project if it could not retain this
control.
It is important to point out that the monitoring tactics discussed
in this Article cannot fully eliminate the agency costs of outsourcing.
Information asymmetry will persist-even in an age of cheap commu-
nication-and principals will never be able to guard against every pos-
sible problem. Furthermore, the incremental expense of these labors
must also be added to the agency cost toll.219 But falling interaction
costs might allow firms to establish an interesting array of hybrid struc-
tures and governance terms-ones that straddle the traditional dis-
tinction between markets and hierarchies.2 2 0 The Wachovia deal is an
intriguing example of this. Joint ventures and alliances between firms
have always existed as a middle-of-the-road approach,221 but the
momentum may be increasing in the outsourcing context.
In summary, then, I would argue that a complete understanding
of the outsourcing explosion needs to consider the exogenous forces
215 Wachovia also signed outsourcing contracts with Hewitt Associates in the
United States and with Infosys Technologies and Cognizant Technologies in India.
Id.
216 See Press Release, Wachovia, Wachovia and Genpact Announce Outsourcing
Agreement (Nov. 30, 2005), available at http://www.wachovia.com/small-biz/page/
printer/0,,447-647%5E1280,00.html.
217 See If in Doubt, Farm it Out, supra note 49, at 7.
218 Id.
219 SeeJensen & Meckling, supra note 12, at 308-10.
220 This distinction is discussed supra Part I.B. It would be interesting to consider
whether similar changes are taking place in other economic relationships that present
an agency cost problem. If so, we might expect that improved monitoring effective-
ness will lead (or has led) to contractual innovations in these other contexts.
221 See, e.g., Smith, Strategic Alliances, supra note 129, at 304.
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impacting the global economy-and the dual impact 
of these forces
on the benefits and costs of outsourcing. The exogenous 
forces-
technology, standardization, communication, transportation, 
and
probably others-collectively lower interaction costs, 
which, in turn,
has two effects. First, it opens new supply markets 
where firms can
obtain the benefits of cheaper production. And 
second, lower inter-
action costs grease the gears of outsourcing 
by making it easier to
detect and prevent agency cost distortions. The 
conventional expla-
nation for the rise of business outsourcing focuses 
mostly on the first
effect. I contend, however, that we must also include 
the second.
CONCLUSION
Near the end of 2005, I flew to Kolkata, India to 
speak at a week-
end conference on business outsourcing. I arrived 
just in time to give
the talk and was not sure what sort of crowd to 
expect. To my sur-
prise, I was ushered into a large ballroom and 
marched up to a stage
in front of a thousand people. There were huge 
video screens on
either side of the stage, and my ten-foot face 
was broadcast for the
next half hour like the President's on Inauguration 
Day. After the
talk was over, dozens of newspaper reporters and 
eager entrepreneurs
flocked up to interview me, and I was filmed for 
the nightly television
news. I thought the speech was pretty good-but 
not that good.
Later, as I wandered through the conference exhibit 
halls, I saw
thousands of vendors fervently pushing their services-and 
hundreds
of thousands of participants trying to ride the outsourcing 
wave. I had
studied all the statistics and projections, but it finally sunk in just 
how
differently firms are organizing their economic 
activity. The obvious
question is why.
This Article has argued that the rise of business 
outsourcing can
be explained, at least in part, by viewing an outsourcing 
project as an
agency relationship. Such an approach sheds 
new light on the con-
tractual framework placed around a typical outsourcing 
transaction.
Specifically, it shows how firms seek to mitigate 
agency risk through
the use of interlocking contracts, detailed service level 
agreements,
staged contractual commitment, redundant 
agents, broad control
provisions, and liberal exit rights. Furthermore, 
macroeconomic
forces may be making it easier for principals to 
monitor agents with
these tools. If so, the conventional explanation 
for the astonishing
growth of outsourcing-that falling interaction 
costs are allowing
firms to access cheaper production markets-may 
be only half of the
story. There can be economic gains when business 
activity is moved to
low-cost markets. But a greater ability to mitigate 
the dark side of out-
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sourcing may also be behind this unprecedented 
march toward eco-
nomic globalization.
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